

## NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

## OFFICE OF MARINE SAFETY

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Major Marine Accident      :
Interviews of Investigation:  :
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JAPANESE FISHERIES TRAINING VESSEL, :
    EHIME MARU              :
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    AND                     :
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U.S. NAVY NUCLEAR ATTACK SUBMARINE, :
    USS GREENEVILLE         :
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Sunday, February 18, 2001

Monday, February 19, 2001

## INTERVIEWS OF INVESTIGATION

INTERVIEW OF CAPT KYLE  
 [ACCOMPANIED BY COMMANDER JOHNSON]

## INTERVIEWING PANEL:

National Transportation Safety Board

TED WHITE, Investigator  
 TOM ROTH-ROFFY, Accident Investigator  
 ROBERT HENRY  
 BILL WOODY  
 BARRY STRAUCH, Human Factor Specialist

United States Navy

CDR JOHN CACCIVIO, SUBPAC

United States Coast Guard

LTJG KEN KUSANO  
 LT CHARLIE JOHNSON

[TRANSCRIPT PREPARED FROM A TAPE RECORDING.]

MR. WHITE: The time is now 11:40 on the 18th of February. We are here now to interview Captain Kyle.

Sir, I am going to waive reading the rest of the information in regard to the National Transportation Safety Board because you have been on board --

MR. WHITE: Okay. Again, if you desire, you may have another person assist you during this interview. Is that the purpose of Commander Johnson?

CAPT KYLE: Yes. I have asked Commander Johnson, who is my principal assistant for at-sea training, to help me, if there is a question about procedures or read some particular procedure, he has brought some books along to help me with getting down

1 to the right element, to get the detail, and he is also  
2 an experienced submarine officer, he may be able to  
3 shed some light on some of the questions you may have  
4 here.

5 MR. WHITE: All right. Thank you.

6 Again, this is Mr. White. What we will do is  
7 I will ask the questions, and then we will pass on to  
8 the other parties here.

9 Sir, I would like to start off with a  
10 description of on the 9th of February, what were your  
11 duties and what position were you actually filling in  
12 the command structure?

13 CAPT KYLE: Okay. This is Captain Kyle from  
14 COMSUBPAC, United States Navy.

15 My job, my job, I work for the Commander,  
16 Submarine Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet as the deputy chief  
17 of staff for Tactics and Training. I am one of the  
18 senior submarine officers on the staff.

19 The staff has several post commanding  
20 officers, 06 captains, but a handful of post major  
21 command captains, and I am one of those small, that  
22 handful of people that are post major command, that  
23 being a squadron command here at Pearl Harbor, and as  
24 such, I was informed on that day I was the acting chief

1 of staff for SUBPAC, because Captain Brandhuber, who is  
2 the chief of staff designate or the actual chief of  
3 staff assigned, was underway on USS Greeneville for  
4 escorting distinguished visitors for at-sea and  
5 orientation cruise.

6 So, although I was acting chief of staff, I,  
7 for most of the day, was working in my office on my  
8 normal business. I made contact with the front office,  
9 the people who run the front office, the chief of  
10 staff's office, to see if there was anything pressing  
11 during the morning.

12 There was not, so I was working in my office,  
13 which is remote from the headquarters office of SUBPAC,  
14 it is a different building, about 200 yards away. It  
15 is on the same base, a short distance down the road.

16 At about 2 o'clock, 1400, on the 9th of  
17 February I was called by the flag secretary, one of the  
18 front office, the admiral's personal assistants, at  
19 1400, informing me that there was an accident --  
20 incident that had occurred, and my presence was  
21 required in the command center.

22 So, I immediately stopped what I was doing  
23 and proceeded to the command center. I probably  
24 arrived there about 1400, so he called me a little bit

1 in advance of that, and was quickly briefed, as I  
2 walked in the building, briefed on the nature of the  
3 accident, that one of our submarines, the Greeneville,  
4 had collided with a fishing boat, and the fishing boat  
5 sunk, and that the chief of staff -- I was reminded  
6 that the chief of staff, Captain Brandhuber, was on  
7 board, and I should point out also that the admiral,  
8 Admiral Konetzni, the actual commander of the Submarine  
9 Force Pacific Fleet was on temporary duty in Japan that  
10 was remote from the headquarters.

11 In the normal course of things then, with the  
12 admiral remote, the day-to-day operation of the  
13 Submarine Force falls on the responsibility of the  
14 chief of staff, and my being the acting chief of staff,  
15 that thrust me into the overall responsibility for  
16 day-to-day operations of the Submarine Force.

17 So, I was quickly brought up to speed on that  
18 up in the upstairs area, the entrance to the  
19 headquarters, proceeded immediately down to the command  
20 center, which I think you have seen is down on the --  
21 you enter the headquarters on the second deck, and the  
22 command center is on the ground floor.

23 So, we went downstairs to the command center  
24 and entered, and obviously, there was a lot going on

1 down there. It took a few minutes to kind of  
2 understand how things were working there, the  
3 communications were going on.

4 The deputy chief of staff for operations,  
5 Captain Bill Winney [ph] basically was in charge of the  
6 command center. He is a counterpart of mine on the  
7 same level in the organization. He is also post  
8 command, post major command captain.

9 It was clear that he was in charge of  
10 immediate response. He was taking reports from the  
11 scene, from the Greeneville, and coordinating  
12 notification of the Coast Guard and higher naval  
13 authority of the accident.

14 It was clear that we had good communications  
15 with the Greeneville on UHF SATCOM, satellite  
16 communications on the UHF frequency. They were making  
17 normal reports. We did not have direct communications  
18 on marine radio from the headquarters out to that site.  
19 It is a VHF circuit and a little too far away, so we  
20 were not hearing VHF COMs in the command center, but  
21 Greeneville was relaying what they knew on the  
22 satellite communications network.

23 We did have an open line, had one person on  
24 telephone direct line to the Coast Guard rescue center,

1 so there was a direct line to the Coast Guard. The  
2 command center was filled with people. There were a  
3 lot of people around, somewhat confused status I guess.

4 Everybody was functioning, but there was a lot of  
5 talking going on obviously in that one space.

6 I got a brief from Commander Captain Winney  
7 on who had been notified. As was stated in one of the  
8 other interviews, the normal process in the Navy for  
9 notifying higher authority up to the leadership of the  
10 Navy, the CNO level, is through OPREP, Operational  
11 Reporting message system.

12 I was informed that the initial voice report,  
13 which is required within five minutes of an incident,  
14 had been made, and that a follow-up report was being  
15 transmitted, which is required in 20 minutes up the  
16 chain of command, that the Coast Guard was notified and  
17 there was sorteeing aircraft and boats to the scene,  
18 that we had also sorted two torpedo recovery craft  
19 from Pearl Harbor sub base to respond to the casualty.

20 They are fairly high speed boats, small  
21 boats. I think you have seen those, small craft, to  
22 help in the search and recovery or SAR effort, and I  
23 was fairly satisfied with the status. Those are the  
24 immediate acts that I considered of concern that that

1 was happening.

2 The message I then conveyed to the boat I  
3 wanted, the information I immediately wanted to receive  
4 was status of survivors and the status of the  
5 Greeneville itself, was the Greeneville safe or in  
6 danger of sinking or further damage.

7 Quickly found out the Greeneville was, in  
8 fact, stable on the surface, not taking on water, and  
9 that conditions were nominal. They did report that  
10 there was a potential problem with the shaft, there may  
11 have been some linkage around the shaft seals, the  
12 shaft seals being the interface between the shaft and  
13 the hull where the shaft penetrates the hull, keeps  
14 water out of the ship around where the shaft goes  
15 through the hull, but that was controllable, and not  
16 threatening, that there was some apparent imbalance in  
17 the shafting area that was limiting the propulsion, the  
18 speed that the Greeneville could proceed, but that  
19 there was no reason that she could not stay, there was  
20 no urgent requirement to send help to her to rescue or  
21 to save that ship or to abandon ship, or do anything  
22 like that.

23 The second thing was survivors. I was a  
24 little bit frustrated with that at first because we

1        didn't know, it was difficult finding out how many  
2        survivors were in the water, anybody floating, anybody  
3        in the water, anybody in life rafts, and I didn't  
4        understand at the time why that was delayed, but I  
5        understand now, in retrospect, I believe I understand  
6        why the report was not as rapid coming because I -- I,  
7        you know, was envisioning these open rafts, but, in  
8        fact, there, of course, are canopies over the top, and  
9        it was difficult to see inside each raft and count  
10       individuals in the rafts, and I understand what they  
11       were trying -- they were trying to -- finally, the  
12       report came back, they have at least 14 people, and I  
13       didn't understand that exactly, I do now, at least 14  
14       people recovered to lifeboats, life rafts.

15                That is what that meant to me in thinking  
16       about it in hindsight, that means that's the number of  
17       people they could count, but there could be other,  
18       additional people under the canopies that they couldn't  
19       see, and that they saw no one in the water at that  
20       point, that all searching of the water area indicated  
21       no one present afloat, adrift, or whatever.

22                The second issue was raised, is there anybody  
23       in distress, you know, obvious distress, and a report  
24       came back there is no one in obvious distress,

1 everybody seems to be in the boats that we can see, any  
2 of the survivors are in lifeboats and are stable.

3 So, the next question was to try to figure  
4 out how many crew were there on the manifest, the  
5 sailing list, and how many survivors were accounted for  
6 in the boats, and I conveyed that out to both the Coast  
7 Guard and to the Greeneville.

8 That was my next priority is to figure out  
9 how many, to try to take accountability of the folks  
10 that were on that boat, and the report came back from  
11 the Greeneville that they had talked to some of the  
12 survivors in the lifeboats, but because of the language  
13 barrier, they were unable to transfer information.  
14 They were not able to convey the question or get the  
15 response as to the number of the crew, the number on  
16 board versus the number in the boats, how many were  
17 missing, or so forth.

18 And we were working through that and I was in  
19 the process of calling the Coast Guard, asking them if  
20 they had any Japanese-speaking people that could go out  
21 to the scene because it became clear to me that we were  
22 dealing -- at that point I didn't know for sure what  
23 the name of the boat was or nationality of the vessel  
24 -- it became clear that -- I think the Greeneville said

1 they were talking Chinese, and I said it's unlikely, it  
2 is probably Japanese, and I asked them, are you sure  
3 it's not Japanese, they said, yes, we think it's  
4 Japanese.

5 And then right after that, or right in that  
6 same time frame came back the name of the vessel, which  
7 was really the Greeneville reported that they had read  
8 the name of the school - the Uwajima Fisheries High  
9 School, which was a real question in our mind, what did  
10 that mean, what is that.

11 You know, that doesn't sound like the name of  
12 a ship, it seems like the name of a school, so I am  
13 trying to figure that out, and I immediately detailed  
14 someone to look in the Internet to see if they could  
15 find a vessel with that name or what size vessel was  
16 it, picture, or so forth, to get the details, see if  
17 there is any information on the Internet, and somebody  
18 smartly sat down and got on the Internet and was  
19 starting to do some homework.

20 At that time, the Coast Guard came back with  
21 the real name of the ship based on the EPERB, receiving  
22 EPERB response, and they notified me of the actual name  
23 of the ship, and we didn't know what to say, you know,  
24 it was Uwajima Fisheries School or is it the name, you

1 know, Ehime Maru, we didn't know what to put, so we put  
2 both of them in the messages forwarding them up the  
3 line.

4 And about in that same time frame, the first  
5 Coast Guard helo arrived on scene and also confirmed  
6 they saw no -- and we got this through the Coast Guard  
7 by telephone from the helicopter -- that they didn't  
8 see anybody adrift, no one not in a lifeboat on initial  
9 survey by the Coast Guard helo.

10 The Coast Guard was saying that they really  
11 needed TWRs out there because they felt like there may  
12 be too many people to recover to the boats that the  
13 Coast Guard was dispatching, so we gave them an ETA.  
14 We contacted the TWRs for an ETA to the site, it was  
15 about 25 to 30 minutes from where they were.

16 They were in communication with the TWRs, and  
17 so they were on their way out, and then based on my  
18 recollection is the next thing, the next major event  
19 that occurred was the fact that the Coast Guard  
20 crewmen, the boats arrived on scene and had recovered,  
21 we are still in doubt as to how many survivors, and the  
22 big piece of information was that the Coast Guardsmen  
23 had arrived at the raft or the life raft that had the  
24 captain, the master on board, and he was able to convey

1       that there were 35 souls on board when they left and  
2       that he counted 25 survivors.

3               That was later, in about 5 or 10 minutes,  
4       amended to say it was actually 26 survivors. I think,  
5       as I understand it, he forgot to count himself, and so  
6       it was really 26. So, we knew we were missing 9 folks,  
7       and at that point in time, that was conveyed, as all  
8       this information was becoming common knowledge, this  
9       was being conveyed up the chain of command and  
10      follow-up message traffic up to -- up our chain of  
11      command by the OPREP reporting system.

12             The Coast Guard, the Coast Guard cutter, and  
13      the RIB arrived, and they said we can get a -- they  
14      indicated that they were going to evacuate the  
15      survivors back to Sand Island. I was happy about that,  
16      that they were able to do that, and we didn't have to  
17      do that with the TWRs.

18             We were trying to figure out -- to ensure,  
19      TWRs don't typically go to Sand Island, so I was  
20      worried that they even had charts on board to go there.

21      I figured they did, but I was trying to find out if  
22      they had any problem going into Sand Island, whether  
23      they had ever been there, whatever.

24             We had a senior naval officer onboard,

1 Commander Ergins [ph] was out there as kind of the OTC,  
2 if you will, officer in tactical control of the TWR or  
3 TWRs, so I felt confident that he would back up the  
4 coxswains if they had to go into someplace they didn't  
5 know, not familiar with.

6 But the Coast Guard said we are recovering  
7 them to Sand Island, the survivors, and they were  
8 underway back there. In the meantime, we were in the  
9 process of trying to -- I was kind of walking -- I was  
10 getting updates in the command center. Commander  
11 Captain Winney was pretty much in charge of  
12 notifications, writing messages. He was briefing me  
13 periodically on what actions we knew and didn't know,  
14 and I was walking between the command center and the  
15 upstairs area where we were busily trying to notify --  
16 trying to notify the families of the submarine that  
17 there had been an accident, so they didn't hear about  
18 it on the news first, so working sort of some of the  
19 other issues, the family issues associated with the  
20 incident with some folks upstairs who were on the  
21 phones there in the Public Affairs Office to convey the  
22 initial the public affairs notification.

23 So, my guesstimate is I would spend, you  
24 know, 10 minutes in the command center, and then I

1 would spend 3 minutes upstairs or 4 minutes getting an  
2 update on what is going on in that group, and Commander  
3 Carpenter, who is flag secretary, and the public  
4 affairs officer and chaplain were up there working the  
5 issues with the families and notification issues.

6 Now, about that time when the Coast Guard was  
7 on station, I think it was about 15 -- as I recall,  
8 1503 was when it was logged, I talked to the Coast  
9 Guard, the RCC, and asked them if they felt like they  
10 had enough assets on station to take charge of the SAR.

11 Obviously, they are better equipped, better  
12 trained to manage the SAR over a long period of time,  
13 and I wanted to transfer that responsibility formally  
14 to the Coast Guard, and I think it was 1503 I got  
15 agreement that they had -- they had enough information,  
16 they knew the status of the casualty, they had all,  
17 enough assets out there to assume SAR duties, so at  
18 1503, I got agreement that they were now responsible  
19 for the search and rescue efforts, and we would be in a  
20 supportive role, standing by to render whatever  
21 assistance we needed.

22 I did get permission -- I asked them if they  
23 needed the Greeneville to stay out there, if she was an  
24 essential portion of the SAR effort. My concern with

1     Greeneville is I knew the Greeneville is not, as has  
2     been discussed numerous -- many people had many  
3     questions about the suitability of Greeneville as a  
4     search and rescue platform or recovery vessel, not the  
5     best vessel, hard, small cockpit, hard to look from the  
6     bridge, periscopes give you limited field of view, have  
7     a big ship out there, not very maneuverable on the  
8     surface, and so I was wondering if it would not be  
9     better to get her out of the way or put her off on the  
10    side someplace where she could be of some help, but I  
11    didn't want her -- I was concerned that she might be in  
12    the way of the active recovery of the vessels on scene,  
13    so I was talking to the Coast Guard about releasing her  
14    from the active SAR business and putting her in some  
15    other role or possibly bring her back, because I didn't  
16    know for sure -- I did get the report there was no  
17    injuries on the Greeneville, but wasn't sure about this  
18    material issue, whether it was lingering or there is  
19    any issues, water, she was actually taking on water at  
20    that point or not and the control rate.

21           I will tell you my thinking at the time was  
22    if there was enough assets out there that I would bring  
23    the Greeneville back that afternoon, that was  
24    overridden, even thought of that, that consideration

1 was overridden at fleet headquarters. They wanted the  
2 Greenville to stay out.

3 In fact, we got notification at that point  
4 that CINCPAC fleet was sorteeing two additional naval  
5 vessels, Salvor and one of the cruisers, I guess it was  
6 Lake Erie or Port Royal, I can't remember which one, it  
7 was brought back and forth, I don't remember which ship  
8 actually ended up responding, one of the cruisers here  
9 was also responding.

10 They wanted Greenville to stay out and be  
11 able to help in whatever regard, and I said that's  
12 fine, no problem. I knew that Greenville had gone to  
13 sea with a reduced crew. We called out to the ship to  
14 make sure they had sufficient watchstanders to  
15 competently operate the ship overnight, and they did.

16 I also asked the status of the visitors  
17 onboard, because they are non -- recognizing that the  
18 non-military folks on board would probably react  
19 traumatically -- I mean everybody reacted  
20 traumatically, but they may not understand and maybe  
21 really -- because they are really in a foreign  
22 environment for themselves -- that they might be  
23 reacting, you know, very negatively or having a very  
24 difficult time with this at sea.

1           So, I checked on their status to make sure  
2       they were okay, and Captain Brandhuber got back to me  
3       on that and said that there was some trauma and some  
4       limited hysteria among some of the guests, but they  
5       were calming down and working hard to -- they were  
6       worried about their own sinking and their own loss of  
7       life, and everything, radiation exposure, and geez, we  
8       are really going to -- you know, very -- they were  
9       fearing for their own lives, and those fears were  
10      allayed in short order, and so it looked like  
11      everything was stable on the Greeneville and it was  
12      fine to keep her out overnight, and that was the  
13      decision.

14           That is really the immediate part. After  
15      that, when the Coast Guard was conducting the search  
16      and recovery, we were continuing to notify the chain of  
17      command of what was going on. Our TWRs were out there,  
18      we were talking to them. They were involved in the  
19      search during the night, as well.

20           TWRs really are into the [inaudible] of  
21      SUBPAC. They are the submarine base here, NSSE, so  
22      they really are a little asset, went out there. The  
23      whole effort went to sort of a status keeping thing.  
24      That was really the significant portion of the

1 immediate response.

2 We then became a supportive role in the  
3 incident, and the decision was made to bring back  
4 Greeneville the next morning sometime, and Admiral  
5 Konetzni got on the next plane, flew back to Pearl  
6 Harbor to basically take charge of the casualty after  
7 that.

8 MR. WHITE: Thank you, Captain.

9 Just to confirm the events that you have  
10 described, obviously, you have been very much involved  
11 in the events since then, but that was your  
12 understanding of events as they transpired based on you  
13 being there?

14 CAPT KYLE: Yes. I was there in the command  
15 center. The times and the sequence of how everything  
16 fell together, I can't say that that was in order. You  
17 are going to have to look. We did make sure there was  
18 an audio log being kept and a written log for a  
19 detailed chronology, what happened and in what order,  
20 and you have to refer to that for the actual  
21 chronology.

22 I have kind of summarized what happened based  
23 on my memory of the significant events, but I can't  
24 tell you, at this point I can't remember which thing

1 happened first exactly or the exact times. You will  
2 have to look at the logs.

3 If you don't have those, all that  
4 information, we should be able to get that, too,  
5 because there was an audio recording being made of all  
6 the reports and a written log also maintained of  
7 everything that went on in that command center.

8 MR. WHITE: Yes, and we have through  
9 Lieutenant Hedrick made sure that that was one of the  
10 things that was requested.

11 My question is really geared more towards  
12 obviously you have been involved in all our briefings  
13 since then, but the information you relayed just now  
14 was basically information as you received it.

15 CAPT KYLE: Right. The only thing is, as I  
16 said, I didn't understand at the time why they were  
17 giving me this report of greater than 14 people. It  
18 seems like an odd report at the time. I didn't go back  
19 and say what do you mean by greater than 14.

20 I took the report. I didn't want to bother  
21 them with that, I mean okay, at least 14, and now I  
22 understand, based on what I have learned since then, I  
23 understand why they are saying greater than 14, because  
24 they couldn't -- 14 is what they could actually see in

1 terms of physical bodies, they couldn't see down in the  
2 bottoms of boats, and stuff like that.

3 MR. WHITE: You mentioned that the admiral  
4 was actually TAD. Does the Navy chain of command mean  
5 that you were basically then acting COMSUBPAC?

6 CAPT KYLE: Yes. Captain Brandhuber became  
7 Acting COMSUBPAC when the admiral left, and then when  
8 Captain Brandhuber went to sea, I was designated as the  
9 acting chief of staff, and thereby the acting --

10 MR. WHITE: COMSUBPAC.

11 CAPT KYLE: COMSUBPAC.

12 MR. WHITE: You mentioned when you first got  
13 the word from the front office and came to the  
14 operations area, you were brought up to speed quickly,  
15 initially, up on the second deck before you went to the  
16 op center.

17 Who brought you up to speed on that?

18 CAPT KYLE: Let's see, I think that was  
19 Commander Carpenter, the flag secretary. He is sort of  
20 the administrative head. He kind of runs the flag  
21 office, but the flag office is right above the command  
22 center, so he had been downstairs and he was the one  
23 who called me, notified me that there had been an  
24 accident, and, you know, when I walked in the door, I

1 ran into him basically and he gave me a quick  
2 understanding of what was going on.

3 MR. WHITE: With regard to you mentioned you  
4 established a line, and kept the line open through the  
5 Coast Guard rescue center.

6 What was your understanding as to which  
7 rescue center, be it the group, be it the joint RCC?

8 CAPT KYLE: I don't know. My understanding,  
9 I only know I was talking to the Coast Guard and I had  
10 actually got on the phone with the individual to talk  
11 to there about a couple things, and it was pretty clear  
12 to me. I didn't know where that phone call was  
13 terminated, I knew it was the Coast Guard link, and it  
14 was obviously somebody who knew a lot about SAR, you  
15 know, they were ready to go, and they were on line, so  
16 there was no doubt in my mind we had found the right --

17 MR. WHITE: Did you initiate the call or was  
18 that already established when you got there?

19 CAPT KYLE: It was already established when I  
20 got there, so there was no doubt. It seemed to me like  
21 we had, we were getting good status, the person on the  
22 other end was very responsive, and when we asked a  
23 question, the question came back quickly. It was not  
24 one of these things where you waited 10 minutes for an

1 answer.

2 I mean there was no doubt in my mind that we  
3 were at the -- we had found the right desk, and I  
4 didn't go into how did we figure out if it was the  
5 right place. It didn't even cross my mind, it was  
6 working.

7 MR. WHITE: You mentioned a couple of times  
8 the confusion between whether it was a school or what  
9 it was, and I think you have already answered this, but  
10 when did you actually learn which vessel it was, or how  
11 did you?

12 CAPT KYLE: Well, the ship reported the  
13 Uwajima Fisheries High School because they had seen  
14 that on the transom or someplace as the ship was  
15 sinking when they looked by visual observation. I  
16 believe they even said through the periscope or I  
17 assume through the periscope, when they looked at the  
18 ship, they read that, spelled it out over the radio.

19 And then, oh, the Coast Guard and -- I am  
20 trying to remember here -- the Coast Guard reported the  
21 EPERB registry, the code or whatever is on the EPERB  
22 across to the Ehime Maru, and then the CONGEN also  
23 reported that it was, I guess based on the Uwajima  
24 Fisheries High School.

1 I believe that report came via the Coast  
2 Guard, that the Consul General said it was the Ehime  
3 Maru, so I was kind of beginning to believe that.  
4 Then, we looked up that -- we started out on the  
5 Uwajima Fisheries High School, got no luck on the  
6 Internet.

7 We went with the other name, and we got the  
8 picture of the boat and a little bit of detail about  
9 it, and it became -- I figured it out during the  
10 process what it was. I was trying to figure out what  
11 this all meant, and I realized, I kind of understood  
12 it's really in our parlance it's a vocational school,  
13 and, you know, understanding that there is a difference  
14 in the education process in Japan, I knew enough about  
15 the system over there, that high school didn't mean  
16 high school like in our terminology.

17 It's a difference in translation, and it  
18 really was a vocational school for those who are not  
19 going on to university, they are going to take up this  
20 vocation, and it kind of made sense to me that there is  
21 a different name. The vessel's name was such and such,  
22 but it was contracted or part of this school.

23 MR. WHITE: I understand.

24 CAPT KYLE: It started to come together.

1           MR. WHITE: When you first came into the op  
2 center, there was communications with the Greeneville  
3 via this HICOM, I assume.

4           CAPT KYLE: Right.

5           MR. WHITE: Who, could you tell who was on  
6 the other end of this HICOM?

7           CAPT KYLE: There were various speakers on  
8 there. There was a consistent speaker. I did talk to  
9 the chief of staff, Captain Brandhuber -- I didn't talk  
10 to him, I don't think I talked on that circuit at all,  
11 but I did hear conversations between Captain Brandhuber  
12 and -- that's the only voice that I really recognized  
13 as being -- that I could identify to a particular  
14 individual.

15          MR. WHITE: We didn't get the opportunity for  
16 a variety of reasons, obviously, to actually hear  
17 conversations on the SATHICOM. Is it good enough  
18 quality where you can recognize voices if you know  
19 them?

20          CAPT KYLE: Pretty good. It is an encrypted  
21 circuit, so obviously, the voice is somewhat garbled, a  
22 little bit distorted by the encryption, but I could  
23 tell Captain Brandhuber's voice, I recognized it. It  
24 is clear enough that if you deal with someone on a

1 common basis, you can recognize the speech pattern, and  
2 the tone is a little different, but you can recognize a  
3 person.

4 MR. WHITE: You mentioned OPREP as far as the  
5 message reporting system. When we were over at the COM  
6 center, they mentioned that it came in as an OPREP 3 or  
7 4.

8 CAPT KYLE: Right, OPREP 3 navy blue. OPREP  
9 3 -- there is different OPREPS -- OPREP 3 is a  
10 significant incident reporting code. That is what it  
11 means. This was a report of a significant incident.  
12 There are others. There is OPREP 1's and 2's, 5's. I  
13 can't even remember what all those things mean.

14 The most common one we use, that we use, that  
15 a ship would initiate, would be an OPREP 3, which is a  
16 significant incident, and then the Navy Blue in code  
17 means that's a -- it's within the Navy. There are two  
18 basic OPREP 3's, Navy Blue and Pinnacle. Navy Blue  
19 goes to the Navy Command Center, Washington, D.C.  
20 Pinnacle goes to the National Command Center.

21 It doesn't mean that the National Command  
22 Center doesn't get notified, it's just that it's more  
23 direct, so it went to the Navy Command Center, and  
24 somewhere in the middle of the casualty, we were

1 directed to change to the Pinnacle reporting format,  
2 that the Navy Center had forwarded our reports up to  
3 the national level.

4 There is a matrix that tells you certain  
5 types of incidents should be, you know, what level it  
6 should be reported.

7 MR. WHITE: In the log as we were reviewing  
8 it over there at the OPCEN, there is reference to  
9 completing the checklist, and this may be where we  
10 start getting into a couple of things as far as  
11 completing the checklist for a collision from OPBOR of  
12 201.

13 CAPT KYLE: Right.

14 MR. WHITE: What would have been involved in  
15 that?

16 CAPT KYLE: Primarily an OPBOR of 201, it  
17 talks about what type of information you are supposed  
18 to try to receive. You know, obviously, in a casualty  
19 like this, people become a little bit shaken, and your  
20 memory of what you are supposed to -- important data  
21 you are supposed to get.

22 For most casualties like this, we will have  
23 sort of a memory aid, I guess, to help you through all  
24 of the items that you should remember to get, and there

1 was a lieutenant or a watchstander in the command  
2 center that had that checklist broken out. That is one  
3 thing I did notice.

4 When I tell you it was kind of confused down  
5 there, it was sort of orderly confusion, a lot of --  
6 you can imagine -- a lot of talking and a lot of  
7 information, people trying to, you know, the biggest  
8 weakness I guess would be everybody is trying to talk  
9 at the same time, and people can't -- can't hear at the  
10 same time, but everybody was very industrious in terms  
11 of everybody had a job.

12 There is people doing the checklist and  
13 checking things off, reading the things and marking off  
14 and taking action to get that checklist done.

15 MR. WHITE: Does that checklist include  
16 besides what information to get to be able to relay out  
17 what actions to be taken in response or perhaps  
18 potential resources to assist or anything of that sort?

19 CAPT KYLE: To be honest with you, I don't  
20 know for sure. I can't tell you what is on the  
21 checklist specifically. I assume there is a good  
22 checklist. I have never really studied the checklist  
23 to tell you what is really on there.

24 You know, I just -- I know how those

1     checklists are generated.  You know, it is some staff  
2     officer, you know, tries to accumulate, get the lessons  
3     learned and accumulate all the requirements and it in  
4     one place, and I had confidence that the people who  
5     have that for a living are doing a good job with that  
6     and it's a good checklist.

7             MR. WHITE:  You say you wanted to bring the  
8     Greeneville in, yet, it was overridden.

9             CAPT KYLE:  Uh-huh.

10            MR. WHITE:  Overridden by whom?

11            CAPT KYLE:  Well, I was considering bringing  
12     her in.  I was trying to think about it.  It was  
13     overridden by the Fleet Headquarters.  The Fleet  
14     Command Center, [inaudible] CINCPAC Fleet was listening  
15     to this on the -- listening to all our discussions on  
16     the SATHICOM.

17            They also listened, monitor the Satellite  
18     HICOM, and they heard that discussion.  Then, the phone  
19     call came down.  This is Admiral Fargo.  I believe  
20     Admiral Fargo himself said leave Greeneville out unless  
21     there is a urgent need to bring her in, in other words,  
22     unless there is any compelling reason to --

23            MR. WHITE:  So, you didn't go up to ask  
24     advice.  That direction came down based on what they

1       were overhearing on the SATHICOM.

2               CAPT KYLE:  Correct.  I would have -- you  
3       know, I was in the process of getting release, getting  
4       Greeneville released, I would have asked for  
5       concurrence on that before I even -- before I had  
6       actually brought her in.  I wouldn't have brought her  
7       in without getting concurrence of CINCPAC Fleet.

8               MR. WHITE:  How did Greeneville feel about it  
9       or the chief of staff when you were in discussions?

10              CAPT KYLE:  They felt -- there was mixed  
11       emotions.  The chief of staff felt that the families,  
12       the visitors on board were a little bit rattled and  
13       that it would be good to get them off as soon as  
14       possible, but obviously, an at-sea transfer was out of  
15       the question.  The only way to get them off the ship  
16       was bring them into Pearl Harbor or some sheltered  
17       area.

18              He would like, in that sense, he would have  
19       liked to get them off because they were very upset, and  
20       the families, their families were going to be  
21       concerned, and so on, and so on, and at first, the  
22       ship, it was unclear what the status of the shaft seal  
23       was.

24              That became clear, and after that became more

1 understood what it was and it was not threatening,  
2 there was no resistance at all about staying out there,  
3 in fact, they said we will stay as long as it takes.

4 So, we were trying to -- along that line, I  
5 forgot to mention it, that was another issue that the  
6 personnel side, the upstairs portion that were working  
7 on the notification of the family members, and so  
8 forth, we were also trying to get the next of kin data  
9 together for the visitors, so that their families could  
10 be notified that they were okay and safe, and not in  
11 any danger.

12 MR. WHITE: That is not something that is  
13 routinely provided when you go out on a --

14 CAPT KYLE: Oh, yeah, they do provide that  
15 data, we were just getting it together and making the  
16 calls to their families to let them know that this  
17 accident occurred, but their loved one or whatever was  
18 okay.

19 MR. WHITE: Who initiated the Navy aircraft  
20 launch? Who was controlling that?

21 CAPT KYLE: That was also launched by -- that  
22 was launched by CINCPAC Fleet. The directions, the  
23 sortee, the cruiser, and the Salvor and the aircraft  
24 was all controlled at the CINCPAC Fleet level.

1           MR. WHITE: How were they cranked into the  
2 loop, through the message traffic?

3           CAPT KYLE: Like I say, they have a command  
4 center. The SATHICOM is on a speaker, so they can  
5 basically hear, everybody is listening to that. You  
6 can hear all conversations, and obviously, this  
7 happened right there.

8           MR. WHITE: Were the also talking on the  
9 SATHICOM?

10          CAPT KYLE: No, no, they did not talk. I  
11 don't remember them ever saying anything.

12          MR. WHITE: So, in the primary COMs between  
13 the submarine and shore were to COMSUBPAC.

14          CAPT KYLE: Yes.

15          MR. WHITE: The fleet or CINCPAC never got  
16 involved directly.

17          CAPT KYLE: No. Exactly how they sorteed or  
18 what phone call or what buttons they pushed to sortee  
19 those ships and aircraft, I don't know how they did  
20 that exactly. You would have to go up there and talk.  
21 We can get those people to come down there and look at  
22 their procedures for sorteeing that.

23          As I understand it, that cruiser was a duty  
24 standby response cruiser for contingencies, and so she

1 was in somewhat heightened manning and readiness to get  
2 underway, and she was able to respond fairly quickly.  
3 Salvor, that was also fairly, you know, fairly rapid  
4 response I thought for, you know, plus getting,  
5 recalling all her sailors, getting away for a Friday  
6 afternoon. You expect by 1500 in the afternoon on  
7 Friday, most of the crew had gone home if they could  
8 have, so they had to get people back in.

9 MR. WHITE: So, Salvor was not under any kind  
10 of a heightened readiness status --

11 CAPT KYLE: I couldn't tell you that. I  
12 don't know that for a fact, I don't know.

13 Excuse me. Could we go off the record for a  
14 second? I have got this phone call coming in here.

15 [Off the record.]

16 MR. WHITE: This is Ted White. We are back  
17 on the record. In the interest of the noon meal, shall  
18 I say, we are going to change the order of questioning.

19 Mr. Henry from the NTSB will follow me.

20 Captain, I have just one additional question  
21 at this time, and that is, you said you knew that they  
22 were underway with a reduced crew. Did you know that  
23 ahead of time, or was that part of information -- when  
24 did you receive that information?

1           CAPT KYLE: I received that information in  
2 the command center, that they told me that they had  
3 left a substantial portion of their crew behind and  
4 that after they got underway. I wasn't aware of that  
5 beforehand, and I found out how many people that were  
6 there. That is why I asked, to make sure they had  
7 enough -- given that factor, did they have enough  
8 people to sustain a competent watch. I figured they  
9 did, but I just needed to make sure that that was not  
10 an open issue.

11           MR. WHITE: And who did you get confirmation  
12 from that there was enough --

13           CAPT KYLE: From the ship itself.

14           MR. WHITE: That is all I have at this time.  
15 Thank you.

16           MR. HENRY: Robert Henry speaking.

17           Captain Kyle, did we ask you what your normal  
18 duties are when you are not acting chief of staff?

19           CAPT KYLE: Yes. I said I was deputy chief  
20 of staff for Training and Tactical Readiness.

21           MR. HENRY: Training and Tactical Readiness.

22           Just one question on training. My  
23 understanding was that the Greeneville had been in the  
24 yard for an extended period of time and had been out

1 for about a month.

2 CAPT KYLE: Correct.

3 MR. HENRY: After the vessel has been out of  
4 service for a while and coming back into service, are  
5 there any required drills, training to be conducted  
6 when getting underway?

7 CAPT KYLE: Okay. I need to step back just a  
8 little bit and explain to you a little bit how we, in  
9 fact, execute the -- how we oversee and do training in  
10 the Submarine Force.

11 Although my title is deputy chief of staff  
12 for Tactics and Training, that is really a programmatic  
13 oversight of what programs we have in place, what  
14 training is being formally structured and bought, what  
15 training devices are available, what schools do we  
16 maintain for our sailors, and I do have a tactical  
17 training arm which Commander Johnson is in charge of.

18 He does go out and periodically ride and  
19 inspect submarines, crews, but the direct individual  
20 responsible for the day-to-day training and readiness,  
21 the overseer of any given ship, submarine force is the  
22 squadron commander, and the squadron commander reports  
23 directly to Admiral Konetzni. In this case, it's  
24 Captain Richneed [ph], the commander of Submarine

1 Squadron 1 is responsible for the oversight of the  
2 day-to-day readiness and training of USS Greeneville.

3 So, that being said, on an ongoing day-to-day  
4 basis, he is really responsible for ensuring the  
5 Greeneville -- serves a back-up to the commanding  
6 officer -- the Greeneville remains ready and competent  
7 to go to sea.

8 Now, this period that they were involved  
9 with, this maintenance period was -- I don't know the  
10 exact time, it was probably a 70-day, 70-, 75-day  
11 off-line status, and that is speculation.

12 It was what we refer to as an SRA, Selected  
13 Restricted Availability. They are specifically  
14 designed, those availabilities are designed to be  
15 limited in length for a couple of reasons. One is  
16 cost, but another reason is exactly the issue you speak  
17 to, is to minimize the time the ship is off-line, so  
18 that the training recovery program is not as  
19 significant as an extended yard availability. That is  
20 one of the factors on why it is as short as it is.

21 The idea is to get it in, get the ship in,  
22 get some things done, improvements, modernization,  
23 required maintenance to get it back out, back on the  
24 line as quickly as we can without incurring a large

1 cost in either fiscal dollars or large training  
2 recovery costs.

3           So, my experience is that while there is some  
4 atrophying of skills while you are in one of these  
5 60-day or 75-day availabilities, it is not -- it is not  
6 a significant loss of capability, so that if you were  
7 in -- the Navy's program is if you were in a shipyard,  
8 a longer shipyard period, there is a very formal crew  
9 certification process of examination and  
10 recertification of the crew's readiness to return to  
11 sea and become competent and basically allowed to  
12 conduct unrestricted operations.

13           In this short, two-month availability period,  
14 it is more or less a refresher training period, go out,  
15 step through the process, make sure the damage control  
16 program, and so forth, for the crew is up to speed.

17           They will typically run some fire drills,  
18 flooding drills, make sure everybody knows where they  
19 need to go, make sure the equipment is still on board,  
20 in fact, they will do a fast cruise, they will run  
21 through drills and casualties before they get underway,  
22 usually 24 hours in length, they will just do it  
23 alongside the pier, shut the hatches, pretend that they  
24 are underway, and run through some -- a good, a good

1 set of -- they will practice just the underway portion.

2           They will run it like a day at sea with some  
3 drills in there, and everybody will go through a set of  
4 specific evolutions to kind of get ready, and they will  
5 go out, and depending on the degree of maintenance, how  
6 many people have changed, the squadron commander may  
7 elect to take some oversight out there, some of his  
8 staff to kind of oversee and review the operation of  
9 the ship and give comment, criticism to the CO, those  
10 things that are not working as well as it should be and  
11 need addressing.

12           Now, whether that happened in this particular  
13 case, I don't know, and I don't follow that on every  
14 ship, because it really is, as I say, the  
15 responsibility and requirement of the squadron  
16 commander to make that assessment, how much is the  
17 experience been -- how much of the experience on the  
18 ship has been lost during the maintenance availability  
19 and what is the required action to get the ship back up  
20 on the line completely.

21           MR. HENRY: Thank you, Captain. Captain, you  
22 have been a source of information since we have been  
23 here on submarine procedures, policies, practices that  
24 have helped us focus our efforts, and in particular, in

1       your briefings at the evening progress meetings.

2               Now that we are on the record, I do have one  
3       question or several questions, and if you feel that you  
4       are not the appropriate person to address those, please  
5       say so, and it concerns the practice of carrying  
6       civilians on the Greeneville and that class of  
7       submarine, and in particular, has there been -- is  
8       there something established in writing as far as the  
9       maximum number of civilians that can be carried on a  
10      demonstration cruise?

11             CAPT KYLE: I don't believe there is. I  
12      don't know that. I may not be the right guy to answer  
13      that question. I personally don't know of that. I am  
14      not saying there is not.

15             There has been over my career in the service,  
16      been discussion about that. To the best of my  
17      knowledge, there is no fixed number. I will try and  
18      find that. I will go to work, get my people to look at  
19      that, but there has been -- there have been cases where  
20      some general guidance has been given on taking  
21      non-military people to sea on ships to ensure that the  
22      proper degree of control can be maintained, that the  
23      ship can be operated safely without the number of  
24      non-military people on there is limited to the point

1 where the ship can continue to perform safely, to  
2 operate the ship properly, and there is enough safety  
3 appliances on board for everybody who is there.

4 MR. HENRY: And my question is, just for the  
5 record, if we could identify whether there is anything  
6 published in the way of an instruction or reference to  
7 a study, or some effort that somebody actually thought  
8 through the maximum number in sort of the way you have  
9 just explained, to make sure that the sub's  
10 capabilities aren't compromised and that it can still  
11 operate safely.

12 CAPT KYLE: So, you would like any written  
13 guidance that exists?

14 MR. HENRY: Written guidance that exists, and  
15 if it was based on any sort of a study or any sort of a  
16 study on the safe level of the number of occupants in  
17 the control room at one time, which would basically be  
18 the crew and then add to that the number of civilian  
19 guests that would still allow the vessel to operate up  
20 to its required level of efficiency and safety.

21 CAPT KYLE: Okay.

22 MR. HENRY: With Captain Brandhuber underway,  
23 you said you were acting chief of staff and I guess in  
24 effect acting COMSUBPAC, what was your understanding of

1 the role and responsibilities of Captain Brandhuber on  
2 the Greeneville?

3 CAPT KYLE: My understanding was that he, as  
4 an escort, provides liaison between the group and the  
5 crew, to answer questions, to try to lift some of the  
6 burden of interface, keep people informed, and off the  
7 backs of the crew, so they can focus on operation of  
8 the ship and to help in that regard, help the ship in  
9 running the demonstration program and to keep things  
10 flowing, to provide advice to the captain on who these  
11 people were and what things might be appropriate to  
12 show or not show, provide some historical background  
13 and maybe the captain himself, because the captain  
14 would be the next senior person on the ship, may not  
15 understand or have understanding of.

16 That is his primary -- that is why he went  
17 out, to provide that liaison.

18 MR. HENRY: And to your knowledge, did his  
19 role change after the collision?

20 CAPT KYLE: No, he continued in that  
21 function, in fact, he was very helpful. I mean if he  
22 hadn't been there, he basically helped with the -- as I  
23 mentioned, there was some limited hysteria -- he helped  
24 quell that. Otherwise that role would have fallen on

1 the backs of the ship. The ship was obviously involved  
2 in trying to find survivors and trying to respond to  
3 the casualty topside, so helped with that  
4 significantly.

5 He provided a very good perspective,  
6 high-level perspective. He did speak on the radio and  
7 talk about status, and that relieved the captain of  
8 having to make those kind of reports that he might want  
9 to make, command level reports.

10 So, he functioned in that -- continued to  
11 function in that role. He was the sort of the liaison  
12 and senior person out there to help with kind of  
13 organize your thoughts. I am sure the commanding  
14 officer was very much rattled by the collision,  
15 recognized that he was responsible in some fashion for  
16 that in some way and to have someone there to kind of  
17 keep things experienced, a little more experienced  
18 person, a few more years, to make sure the right  
19 priorities are set on the ship, it was probably very  
20 helpful.

21 MR. HENRY: Thank you.

22 CAPT KYLE: That is all speculation. That's  
23 not --

24 MR. HENRY: I prefaced it based on to your

1 understanding.

2 You had mentioned the required reports that  
3 should come at 5 and 20 minutes. Those are verbal?

4 CAPT KYLE: Verbal report in 5 minutes, and a  
5 written report in 20.

6 MR. HENRY: The written is a message format?

7 CAPT KYLE: Yes. There is a template for  
8 that. It tells you what things you are supposed to  
9 report, checklist format.

10 MR. HENRY: With the chronology of the  
11 accident occurring sometime around 1345, and the  
12 responsibilities being passed to the Coast Guard for  
13 SAR at 1503, we are talking about an hour and 15  
14 minutes?

15 CAPT KYLE: And hour and how many? An hour  
16 and 20 minutes.

17 MR. HENRY: Twenty minutes? An hour and 20  
18 minutes. What precisely was the role of the  
19 communication center, were you doing just COMs or were  
20 you doing search planning?

21 CAPT KYLE: No. At that point, at that point  
22 we were trying to -- my focus on that was to ensure, to  
23 minimize, make sure, first things first, and that was  
24 to make sure that there was nobody in distress, and if

1       there was somebody in distress, to afford assistance  
2       there as soon as possible, and that was my priorities.

3               The second thing was to get -- make sure the  
4       Coast Guard and recovery forces, who could better  
5       respond to the search and rescue effort, were really  
6       professionals at this stuff, were coming on scene,  
7       because I knew the accident occurred close to Honolulu  
8       and that the deployment time from the Coast Guard  
9       station at Sand Island would be fairly short and I  
10      wanted to make sure they were enroute as soon as  
11      possible.

12             We are not -- we are not set up really to  
13      organize or run a search and rescue effort for a long  
14      period of time. That is not our -- we are not, you  
15      know, we are not set up to do that. That would not be  
16      our normal role in this type of affair.

17             If we are in the vicinity of some supporting  
18      agency, we would again turn it over to the experts as  
19      quickly as we could. Obviously, we are the initial  
20      people on scene, we are the only guy there, and so I  
21      wanted to make sure that the priorities are going right  
22      and the information was flowing up, and we can pass  
23      that to the Coast Guard.

24             At the beginning of the casualty, the boat

1 had reported they were having difficulty talking to the  
2 Coast Guard, and eventually it was resolved. I don't  
3 know what -- I don't know what caused that problem, so  
4 we were sort of the -- we were maintaining the link  
5 between the actual scene as it was going on and what  
6 the Coast Guard knew at the rescue center.

7 Eventually, they got -- established some  
8 directs COMs there, but -- so that was sort of the --  
9 what I saw the function of our center.

10 MR. HENRY: So, at 1503, what was passed to  
11 the Coast Guard was really the communication  
12 responsibilities?

13 CAPT KYLE: No, the actual search  
14 responsibilities, I know they have procedures and  
15 methodology for calculating search and, you know, wind  
16 blowing, and how to figure all that stuff out, where  
17 the search vector go, and what assets are on station  
18 and what is the best use of those assets.

19 I didn't have direct control of that  
20 helicopter, I didn't have direct control of those Coast  
21 Guard boats coming out there, so, you know, they have  
22 all that, MOU set up for support. I mean that is their  
23 main, one of their main businesses in life, and they  
24 are really the pros at that stuff, we are not.

1           That is not our main business in life, that  
2           is sort of, you know, we do it until we are relieved,  
3           and we try to get the Coast Guard, get the experts on  
4           scene as quickly as we can.

5           MR. HENRY: So, prior to 1503, the Coast  
6           Guard was not directing any specific search?

7           CAPT KYLE: I can't say that for sure. I  
8           don't know that the helicopter wasn't being directed by  
9           the Coast Guard headquarters. I wanted to make it a  
10          clear demarcation that I didn't want cross signals to  
11          go, I didn't want to be telling somebody to do  
12          something, and the Coast Guard telling somebody else to  
13          do something else, and therefore, being a confused  
14          effort.

15          So, that is why I wanted to ensure that I was  
16          standing down from any direction to any forces. I  
17          wasn't going to direct the search and recovery, I was  
18          there to support, ready to go, anything they needed  
19          from us, and as far as I was concerned, whoever the  
20          lead man at the Coast Guard station at the rescue  
21          center, was now OTC at the search and recovery.

22          MR. HENRY: And that included directing the  
23          Greeneville and once communications were established  
24          and whatever the Coast Guard felt the Greeneville could

1 contribute to a search?

2 CAPT KYLE: Absolutely. I would expect the  
3 Coast Guard would have asked us to do whatever  
4 Greeneville, but if Greeneville was asked directly by  
5 one the on-scene people, by channel 16 or whatever  
6 circuit they were on, that would have fine. They would  
7 have gone after it.

8 MR. HENRY: I guess my question was did that  
9 actually happen, was the Coast Guard directing  
10 Greeneville in search efforts?

11 CAPT KYLE: I kind of assumed they were, but  
12 I don't think that actually happened. That's a  
13 retrospect thing now that I have talked to some --  
14 heard some of these people ask this question yesterday  
15 to the executive officer of the ship whether they were  
16 part of a -- given a search area or sector, or given  
17 any direction to search specifically, and they said no,  
18 but it was clearly stated that we were ready to employ  
19 Greeneville to continue the search, she was going to  
20 remain on station to conduct search, and it was at the  
21 disposal of the Coast Guard station to do so.

22 MR. HENRY: But the torpedo recovery boats  
23 were being directed by the Coast Guard.

24 CAPT KYLE: Yes, Eventually, when they got

1 out there, they were also turned over to the Coast  
2 Guard.

3 MR. HENRY: That's fine. That completes my  
4 questions.

5 CAPT KYLE: You see, on the way out, before  
6 the Coast Guard was there, we were talking to the Coast  
7 Guard, telling them where to go, what core speed, how  
8 to get there, and how fast, and once they arrived on  
9 station, I definitely wanted the Coast Guard to employ  
10 those boats as if they were their own, and I didn't --  
11 that was the whole purpose of the 1503 turnovers, that  
12 those assets are now yours, use them however you need  
13 to use them.

14 MR. HENRY: Including the Greeneville.

15 CAPT KYLE: Yes.

16 MR. HENRY: Thank you, Captain.

17 MR. WHITE: We need to stop.

18 [Off the record.]

19 MR. WHITE: We are back live. We are going  
20 to resume the interview with Captain Kyle. The time is  
21 about 0743. The date is the 19th of February, 2001.

22 Good morning, Captain Kyle. Thanks for  
23 coming here.

24 CAPT KYLE: Good morning.

1           MR. WHITE:  Sir, we would like to now turn  
2           our interview towards some of the other aspects of your  
3           duties as deputy chief of staff.

4           One of the areas I am interested in is the  
5           operational readiness exams that the vessel is  
6           subjected to.  If you could give us a little bit about  
7           that periodicity, types of things that the crew has to  
8           demonstrate in terms of proficiency and whether or not  
9           some of these evolutions that they were undergoing are,  
10          in fact, demonstrated to some sort of an examining  
11          board or whatever the term is.

12          CAPT KYLE:  This is Captain Kyle of the  
13          United States Navy.  The training regimen for a  
14          submarine goes over the spectrum of its operation, the  
15          operating cycle, so I will start with a very basic  
16          concept of how the operating cycle of the submarine  
17          goes, and we will start from the completion I would say  
18          of major shipyard availability, not one like I was  
19          discussing yesterday, a two-month availability, but a  
20          major availability, such as new construction of the sub  
21          or a major refit, improvement period lasting several  
22          months up to a year or more where the ship goes really  
23          off-line for a period of time.

24          The ship would come out of that availability

1 and go through initial crew certification, which is the  
2 way I described that basically is boat is examined by  
3 its superiors prior to initial operation or going to  
4 sea to check on basic mariner skills, basic submariner  
5 skills basically, can they man a competent watch, can  
6 they navigate properly, can they maintain depth  
7 keeping, do they have adequate propulsion plant  
8 operators.

9 Obviously, all of our ships are nuclear  
10 powered, so a lot of our training effort, there is a  
11 significant training effort and a certification effort  
12 involved in maintaining the currency in the nuclear  
13 propulsion plant area. That's a major focus,  
14 conditional crew certification, but a similar -- a  
15 similar effort is conducted in the tactical or basic  
16 mariner skills.

17 Damage control drills are run. There is a  
18 whole regimen laid out in our training -- instruction  
19 training manual that discusses the crew certification  
20 process and the requirements, and we can provide a copy  
21 of those paragraphs to you.

22 MR. WHITE: What document is that called  
23 again, sir?

24 CAPT KYLE: Submarine Training, Joint

1 Training Manual, joint being between the submarine  
2 forces in the Pacific and Atlantic, that is why the  
3 joint word is in there.

4 And that involves both shoreside evaluation  
5 and then an at-sea evaluation by the ship's immediate  
6 superior in command. That is referred to as ISIC. In  
7 this case, as I mentioned yesterday, it would be his  
8 squadron command infrastructure.

9 So, once that basically gets the ship out of  
10 the shipyard and into some semblance of safe mariner  
11 submarining capability. At this point, he is really  
12 not what I would consider ready for war or ready for  
13 front-line operations. He is basically certified for  
14 local operations. It is the first step in getting him  
15 back up on the readiness scale to go into forward  
16 action, whether a peacetime deployment or war, if it  
17 was a wartime or combat situation, to go into ready for  
18 combat.

19 He then goes out and then becomes -- goes  
20 through a series of certifications, and, you know, it's  
21 a real potpourri of different certifications. There  
22 are certifications for salvage, there are  
23 certifications, you know, kind of what I would call  
24 some of them, I don't want to call them less important,

1 but they are smaller in terms of scope, limited in  
2 scope, important in their own right, in their own area,  
3 but as far as the overall ship, they are limited scope  
4 inspections.

5 At some point in time, about I think within  
6 the first -- correct me if I am wrong, Commander  
7 Johnson -- but it's within the first four to six months  
8 coming out of shipyard, it goes through what is called  
9 a post-overhaul refresher training period, following by  
10 a tactical weapons certification, TWC. I think within  
11 about four months is about --

12 CDR JOHNSON: About four months is correct.

13 CAPT KYLE: -- is about correct, and during  
14 that period, the ship and crew will go through about  
15 nominally a two-week intensive training period at one  
16 of our submarine training centers, such as will be  
17 visited this week, the submarine training center  
18 Pacific up on the hill here where the ship control  
19 trainer is one of those type of training centers, and  
20 they will go through advanced -- I don't want call  
21 advanced -- but submarine warfare skills, damage  
22 control training, ship control training, various skills  
23 in a school environment under the tutelage of  
24 instructors, qualified instructors, through a specific

1 program.

2 This again is monitored. The progress of  
3 this training is monitored by the ship's immediate  
4 superior in command, squadron and staff, and that is  
5 culminated then by an at-sea evaluation of about a week  
6 or maybe perhaps 10 days depending on how things go,  
7 but there is again an agenda of things to be examined  
8 during that at-sea period and the TWC.

9 It is during this period we run damage  
10 control drills, we run emergency surface -- could run  
11 possibly emergency surfacing drills although it may not  
12 occur. I mean emergency surfacing may or may not be  
13 part of that agenda, but certainly some sort of  
14 flooding casualty will be in there.

15 He will be certified on his weapons, he will  
16 be checked out that he is competent to handle, employ,  
17 launch his weapon systems. He would be examined in the  
18 sonar processing to see that he could track complex  
19 targets, difficult tracking targets on an ongoing basis  
20 and in a combat situation.

21 He would be check on sensor employment,  
22 periscopes from a tactical standpoint, sort of an  
23 advanced level. Some of these things would have been  
24 checked in the earlier one, but sort of at a more basic

1 level, a day-to-day safety level, but at this point  
2 now, he is getting -- once he completes this  
3 certification, he is considered a full-up round, if you  
4 will, ready-to-go, you know, one of the regular ships  
5 out here ready for service.

6 He would be given his initial weapons  
7 loadout, and he would be more or less in a -- I guess  
8 what you would consider a standby mode for deployment.

9 He wouldn't be ready for deployment, but he could be  
10 -- he is now a deployable submarine.

11 Okay. The next phase from that would be the  
12 next step up from there, would be at about the 10- to  
13 12-month period, we would try, after this overhaul  
14 period -- we would try to get the ship ready for  
15 deployment to the Western Pacific, and at six months  
16 prior to that period, six months prior to the  
17 deployment date, the ship would enter into what is  
18 referred to as the pre-overseas movement period, and  
19 that is a dedicated and focused time for the ship, sort  
20 of a stand-alone, and we call it the POM period,  
21 pre-overseas movement.

22 Once he enters POM, he becomes a special  
23 category boat. He gets special status in our eyes in  
24 the management of that submarine, because he is getting

1 ready for deployment, he gets more focus and attention  
2 from the entire infrastructure support in the submarine  
3 force.

4 That includes in area of maintenance, if  
5 something breaks, he gets kind of priority,  
6 front-of-the-line privilege to get his equipment fixed  
7 and maintained. You know, he is sort of a special  
8 category, he's in the sun in terms of everybody is  
9 paying attention to what he needs and he is getting I  
10 guess what you would call front-of-the-line treatment.

11 During that period, there is a specific  
12 regimen of training requirements that have to be  
13 accomplished. There is basic POM training, which kind  
14 of brings back those same skills that were done in the  
15 TWC at that kind of level, you know, strong, but maybe  
16 not at the peak level, but, you know, good, healthy  
17 training.

18 They will be doing tracking of different  
19 submarines, they will be under periscope depth, they  
20 will be looking at damage control capabilities, they  
21 will be looking at track and basic kind of contacts,  
22 kind of making sure there is no holes in their basic  
23 level, bringing them up, anything that isn't quite  
24 buffed up to -- you know, is tarnished a little bit or

1     fallen away, dust off those skills, and then we go into  
2     the advanced POM training, which now goes against  
3     targets that are -- or contacts or situations that  
4     replicate the same level or challenge perhaps that they  
5     would have on their deployment.

6             We kind of focus that now. We are trying to  
7     get nearer the deployment day, so that we are really  
8     focusing on the teams that will be standing watch  
9     together on deployment, the actual people, recognizing  
10    that in the Navy, one of our biggest challenges in the  
11    training business is we have a very fluid work force,  
12    people come and go at a very frequent rate, so we are  
13    always, you know, despite the fact back in the TWC, we  
14    trained this crew, that crew is not the same in any  
15    regard by the time they are in the POM process.

16            You have lost maybe a quarter to a third of  
17    those people who are trained in the TWC are new people  
18    when you get into this POM period, and that is just the  
19    nature of our business. The average tour length on  
20    board a submarine for an enlisted guy may be in the  
21    area of four to five years, or some guys may be there  
22    even shorter, three years; officers around the ship,  
23    maybe for no more than three years.

24            So, you can see there is a regular role of

1 people coming and going to the ship, and that does  
2 create an ongoing challenge in terms of training.

3 So, at this advanced -- going back to my  
4 story, my timeline -- at the advanced POM training  
5 period, we are trying to now -- we have pretty much got  
6 -- pretty much with maybe a couple of exceptions -- got  
7 the crew on board that is going to deploy with the  
8 ship, and we are trying to really develop the on-watch  
9 team concept of working together and understanding  
10 everybody's strengths, weaknesses, and really  
11 developing, you know, gelling the team.

12 After the advanced POM period, we go out to  
13 sea, probably two or three times, and I am a little  
14 vague there because -- I am being a little vague  
15 because it's not precise, it depends on what the ship  
16 is going to be doing, what type of missions, what type  
17 of employment.

18 If a submarine is going to deploy in consort  
19 with a battle group, there is an aircraft carrier,  
20 there is some training they get to integrate them into  
21 that battle group team. If they are going to be an  
22 independent deployer, not associated with a battle  
23 group, they may have a different slant to their  
24 training. It really is kind of customized to what we

1 expect that ship to be doing during its deployment, and  
2 we will focus at-sea events that are designed to  
3 challenge the submarine with the same type of  
4 challenges that they will see on deployment.

5 Again, this is organized by the ship's  
6 immediate superior in command, and gets a letter  
7 basically from us, the submarine's commander, the  
8 submarine force, that tells the captain of the ship and  
9 his boss, squadron, what specific skills that we expect  
10 that ship to have to do on deployment, so if it is off  
11 of this letter that they generate the training plan for  
12 this POM period.

13 This is all culminated then by a series of  
14 certifications where the actual squadron commander  
15 certainly will ride if possible, if he's not conflicted  
16 out, he will try, he will get on there sometime during  
17 the POM, he will try certainly to ride the POM cert if  
18 he can.

19 A representative of my staff, typically,  
20 Commander Johnson, will ride on those POM certs or  
21 myself, I have ridden several of them myself, to  
22 observe the ship in a deployment replicating scenario.

23 During those certifications, typically, they  
24 are examined in warfare, tracking, and basic mariner

1 skills, all of which are stretched to the max or tested  
2 to the maximum on deployment. That is our product.  
3 That is what we work -- if we were looking at a  
4 production line here, as a corporation, our product for  
5 the nation is deliver deployable submarines.

6 So, this is the culmination of all the work,  
7 is to get out on deployment, and it is that  
8 certification that the squadron commander does in  
9 consort with a member of my staff, myself or typically  
10 Commander Johnson here.

11 We huddle at the end of that. We look at all  
12 the comments written, all the observations made, and  
13 the squadron commander must make the decision and write  
14 Admiral Konetzni, the force commander, a letter that  
15 says USS Submarine is ready for deployment in all  
16 respects, all these areas have been looked at, here are  
17 the significant -- any significant issues in any area.

18 The ship is either certified or not certified to go.

19 Now, and that is a typical workup from a  
20 deployment period, from an overhaul or significant  
21 maintenance period to deployment. If a ship came back  
22 from deployment and did not have one of these big  
23 maintenance periods, she would have sort of an  
24 abbreviated training period call a tactical weapons

1 proficiency evaluation, which is of the same scale as  
2 that certification, but perhaps not quite as intense  
3 because it is assumed that not all of her skills have  
4 atrophied.

5           It would be a little bit -- it would not go  
6 so much back to the basics, it would start at a level a  
7 little higher than the basics, and then work them back  
8 up again to look for any weaknesses and polish up any  
9 areas that may be a little tarnished and emphasize to  
10 the boat issues.

11           It would involve a period at the training  
12 center, so the training center would work with the  
13 crew. It would also involve a period at sea.

14           So, I think that pretty much -- unless I left  
15 something out obvious -- that covers pretty much the  
16 training program and how we stay involved with each  
17 ship, and these training periods are all laid out in  
18 this joint training manual. They talk about how you  
19 prepare people - two documents. The joint training  
20 manual and the POM are pre-overseas movement  
21 instruction.

22           Unfortunately, the POM overseas movement  
23 instruction, because it discusses some details of  
24 deployment operations, is classified at the Secret

1 level, so if you want to look at that, we would  
2 probably have to write -- honestly, would have to write  
3 some synopsis of -- we could probably show you excerpts  
4 of it, show you the detail that it is written in, but  
5 it would be very difficult to turn over an exact copy.  
6 It would be much abridges, trimmed out.

7 You would see a lot of tattered papers,  
8 because it does discuss, you know, the details of  
9 submarine operations to some degree of minutia there,  
10 so it would be a tough manual to give you.

11 But those two documents in consort, plus  
12 another book called The Tactical Weapons Proficiency  
13 Manual Instruction, give the details of how to conduct  
14 one of those evaluations, will have probably have  
15 interest to answer your question, you know, in a sense  
16 of documentation or programatics.

17 MR. WHITE: Okay, sir. Barry, I would like  
18 to go ahead and give you the opportunity, since you  
19 will be leaving, to continue the questioning.

20 MR. STRAUCH: Captain, good morning.

21 CAPT KYLE: Good morning.

22 MR. STRAUCH: I am going to ask kind of broad  
23 questions. Were you familiar with or are you familiar  
24 with the general submarine tactics, procedures,

1       evolutions at the time of the Houston accident?

2               CAPT KYLE:   Yes.

3               MR. STRAUCH:   Could you tell me what changes  
4       were implemented in procedures, tactics, evolutions as  
5       a direct result of the Houston accident?

6               CAPT KYLE:   Oh, I am sorry, you asked about  
7       the Houston accident?

8               MR. STRAUCH:   Yes.

9               CAPT KYLE:   I am lightly familiar with that.  
10       I am sorry, I was -- I thought you were saying the  
11       Greeneville accident -- but the Houston accident.  I am  
12       familiar with the general circumstances of that  
13       accident, however, I was not in a position to tell you,  
14       I was much more junior, it was 10 years ago, I was just  
15       going to command my own ship, so for me to recall what  
16       programmatic changes were made as a result of that  
17       collision, it would be a stretch for me.  I don't know  
18       that I can remember back.  If I struggle here for a  
19       little bit, I might remember.

20               MR. STRAUCH:   That's all right.

21               CAPT KYLE:   I just don't, you know, that is  
22       10 years ago.  We still study that collision as a case  
23       study, and I have taught that collision on several  
24       occasions, but I don't remember any specific changes in

1 doctrine or procedure or policy that I can point to as  
2 a result of that.

3 We did make a change. I remember as an  
4 example, I remember thinking there was a discussion at  
5 the time that the operating area that she was assigned,  
6 the Houston was assigned to operate in overnight, that  
7 accident occurred in conjunction with the filming of a  
8 movie. That is what the ship was basically out there  
9 for, we were supporting, asked to support the filming  
10 of the Hunt for Red October, and there was discussion  
11 made at the location of that.

12 Where those operations were taking place was  
13 off Los Angeles, between Los Angeles, Santa Catalina  
14 Island, the discussion was made that that was a very  
15 sort of inappropriate place to put the ship for  
16 extended submarine operations and doing those types of  
17 operations because of the very heavy traffic in that  
18 area. There was obviously a lot of shipping in and out  
19 of San Pedro. It was just not considered a vary  
20 optimum place to conduct operations that were not  
21 considered critical to the defense of the nation.

22 So, that, I do remember that part for sure,  
23 that operations up in that area were reviewed with a  
24 lot of concern, if we sent a submarine up there for any

1 reason, it would be kind of transited through there,  
2 but we are not putting holding areas up there for  
3 continued operations off Los Angeles, and I think that  
4 still exists today.

5 We may make a trip through there, but we  
6 transit through and keep on going. We don't stay, we  
7 don't operate typically off of Los Angeles, it is just  
8 not a good -- not an optimum place for a submarine to  
9 have to operate because of the contact density.

10 MR. STRAUCH: Since you are not familiar with  
11 it, I won't push this issue with you, but it is  
12 interesting that you teach this accident as a case  
13 study. Who are the students in the classes that you  
14 teach this to?

15 CAPT KYLE: A few years back I was the  
16 prospective commanding officer instructor. One of the  
17 elements that we would teach out of that case study is  
18 the degree of involvement of the commanding officer in  
19 decisions to go to periscope depth, how much was  
20 involved, and how do you do the analysis of the  
21 periscope depth event, the decisions on what sensors to  
22 employ for periscope depth event, and some of the --  
23 some of the follow-on actions, should you be involved  
24 in untoward incident, how do you help out, you know,

1     what are the issues about getting the word to people  
2     and dissemination of information out to the rest of the  
3     world for help to exist in the recovery of survivors.

4             MR. STRAUCH:  So, it sounds like the students  
5     are prospective commanders?

6             CAPT KYLE:  Yes, a submarine commanding  
7     officer is selected for command somewhere when he is  
8     probably an XO time frame.  He goes through a screening  
9     board, his record is put up, and he is selected, is  
10    going to be a commanding officer.

11            Then, before he reports to his ship to be a  
12    commanding officer, he goes through a six-month  
13    training period specifically designed to get him ready,  
14    to buff him up on all aspects of being a CO.

15            Three months of that is spent in propulsion  
16    plant training because he will be in charge of that  
17    nuclear reactor, and three months of that is spent on  
18    what we refer to as the tactics course, but it is  
19    really judgment, command leadership, tactical  
20    employment, how do you develop teamwork on your ship,  
21    and warfare skills, you know how do you do proper  
22    target analysis.

23            So, in that context, in that course, that is  
24    the course I was teaching, is a tactics course, a

1 three-month tactics course, we would spend a lot of  
2 time on leadership skills and where other people have  
3 gone wrong, what are the lessons learned out of those  
4 incidents where people had trouble or previous  
5 commanding officers have got themselves into trouble,  
6 and what were the lessons or previous incidents and how  
7 to take the lessons back, so they are not forgotten.

8 One of the case studies we have covered, we  
9 covered when I was that instructor, was the collision  
10 of Houston with the tug.

11 MR. STRAUCH: Was the selection of this  
12 particular accident as a case study, was that something  
13 that you made or did somebody else make it and they  
14 asked you to cover it in the class?

15 CAPT KYLE: There is a case study manual or a  
16 series -- at that time, we have modified it since then,  
17 we have modernized it -- but at that time we had  
18 probably 10 or 11 collisions that were selected by  
19 probably my predecessor as a PCO instructor, but we  
20 would evaluate -- it was our responsibility to maintain  
21 this file up to date. As a more current or more  
22 relevant incident could come along, we would pick that  
23 and maybe replace one of them.

24 We had a standing file of about a dozen

1 collisions and a dozen groundings, submarine groundings  
2 that occurred, that would be in this case study file.  
3 It would be available to every submarine, every  
4 squadron, and we had it, all training centers had that,  
5 and each ship was required to conduct a certain amount  
6 of training out of this inventory every year on a  
7 recurring basis, so that these lessons would be told  
8 over and over again as a refresher.

9 MR. STRAUCH: You were talking about teaching  
10 the Greeneville accident to prospective COs and at what  
11 point they get it, and it is one case among a dozen or  
12 so cases.

13 Are all 12 or so covered or it is up to the  
14 instructors?

15 CAPT KYLE: In the course of the three-month  
16 period, we would cover -- we would cover all the cases.

17 We would do -- we would do them maybe one a night or  
18 we would go through a sequence where we would do one  
19 every other day or something like that we would cover.

20 They were edited to the point where you could  
21 cover one competently and fully and completely in about  
22 an hour, discuss it. It had viewgraphs that showed  
23 what happened, the tactical maneuvering and kind of  
24 gave you what happened and then the lessons learned,

1 and we would -- the method of instruction would be  
2 let's go through the case, let's read what happened, we  
3 would stop the discussion and then discuss what among  
4 the students, you know, what do they see as the issues  
5 as a teaching method.

6 MR. STRAUCH: Is that case -- do you know if  
7 Commander Waddle was in a class in which this case was  
8 covered?

9 CAPT KYLE: I don't know that for a fact  
10 whether that -- do you know if that is still in the --  
11 I haven't looked at that case study book in a while --

12 CDR JOHNSON: This is Commander Johnson. No,  
13 I don't know if he studied that in his PCO course, but  
14 I can be almost 99.99 percent confident that he has  
15 seen that case study sometime in his career.

16 The first time I saw that case study was when  
17 I was in submarine officer's advanced course in Groton.  
18 This is the course of study part of being a department  
19 head. We studied that particular grounding or  
20 collision, as well as several other collisions that  
21 Captain Kyle has talked about.

22 CAPT KYLE: I would agree with that. If he  
23 didn't cover it at that course, somewhere in his career  
24 it was in the library, he had seen it.

1           MR. STRAUCH: What are the lessons, either of  
2           you, what are the lessons that you would like students  
3           to get out of the Houston collision?

4           CAPT KYLE: You asked me cold here. I  
5           haven't reviewed, reread that collision. Although I  
6           have it in my folder, I haven't had a chance to reread  
7           the whole, refamiliarize myself with it all.

8           As I recall, the issues were --

9           MR. STRAUCH: Can I interject? I think one  
10          of the key issues, as I recall, was that the ship was  
11          already at periscope depth, and it was at night, and  
12          there was confusion as to the lighting scheme on the  
13          tug.

14          The officer of the deck had not recognized  
15          the lighting scheme, that it was a tug with a tow, and  
16          failed to recognize that this lighting scheme that was  
17          on the left, drawing left, and the lighting on the  
18          right, drawing right, was actually the tug was on the  
19          left, and the tow was on the right, and he was going  
20          right between them.

21          CAPT KYLE: That was one issue. I do  
22          remember this was analysis, similar in some respects to  
23          this event in that they were in a hurry to get to  
24          periscope depth to copy a broadcast and to get a

1 NAVSAT, a satellite fix, and so there was some urgency  
2 to get up there, and the analysis -- in those days, we  
3 had, in order to get a fix, to fix a ship's position,  
4 we had to copy a satellite that would pass overhead, 4  
5 GPS, and you had to be there when the satellite rose,  
6 and you had to be on time. If you missed the rise of  
7 the satellite, you wouldn't get the fix.

8           They also have a fixed broadcast schedule to  
9 get the radio traffic at a certain time starts, and if  
10 you miss that time, you miss the broadcast, as well,  
11 and so they were in sort of a hurry, they had a lot of  
12 contacts, and they were sort of in a hurry to proceed  
13 to periscope depth, some urgency involved, and in some  
14 regards it was very similar to this case, in that they  
15 did not earn contact analysis as well as they should  
16 have, they didn't realize this contact was as close as  
17 it was when they went to periscope depth.

18           MR. STRAUCH: One of the things that really  
19 surprised me in the last couple of days was how much of  
20 the contact determination is really subject to human  
21 interpretation, and I guess given the sophistication of  
22 the weapon system we are talking about, I mean frankly  
23 I found it kind of surprising.

24           It really depends on the expertise of the

1 individuals involved, the ability of individuals to  
2 access certain paper and pencil materials, and I am  
3 sure you are aware that the more you subject something  
4 to human interpretation, the more you have manual  
5 processes involved, the more likely errors are to be --  
6 are when you throw a wrench into this, such as putting  
7 civilians in between somebody's desk and his station.

8           What are your thoughts about that? Just how  
9 much people have to think about things, interpret  
10 things to determine whether or not there are vessels on  
11 the surface?

12           CAPT KYLE: Well, you are correct in a sense  
13 that it is not -- it is not a totally automated system,  
14 and it really depends on trained operators, you have to  
15 be a thinking person up there. You can't just turn off  
16 your brain and expect everything to be fine, we do  
17 spend an awful lot of time from the very beginning  
18 training officers and crew members on the principles of  
19 target motion analysis, and we try to put into place a  
20 series of checks and balances to make sure that it is  
21 not a single point safe, dependent on a single  
22 individual to make the call on safety to go to  
23 periscope depth, so it is an independent review is  
24 conducted of the procedures taken to conduct the ascent

1 to periscope depth.

2 But it is the nature of the problem that  
3 there is no directly automated process by which we can  
4 do this analysis without human oversight. We are  
5 getting better. There are -- you know, we are in the  
6 process of installing systems on the board that are  
7 more automated, that have greater capability to do  
8 automated analysis of target motion analysis, but to  
9 date, none of them, none of those systems by themselves  
10 is infallible either. There are assumptions made at  
11 each one of those that if not completed, would yield  
12 inaccurate results.

13 So, no matter, even though the machine is  
14 providing inputs and consideration, you know, given  
15 certain assumptions, this is where the contact would  
16 be, it still requires an overall sanity check. It  
17 needs a human in the loop to look at this and do an  
18 independent evaluation to see that the automated result  
19 is, in fact, realistic and jibes with the data that is  
20 available to the operator for observation to see that  
21 it is correct, and I don't think -- I just don't see  
22 even I am very heavily involved in my business of  
23 modernizing that whole process and looking at options.

24 We have got a lot of people, a lot of smart

1 people working on that for us because frankly, the  
2 demands of the country have forced our submarine force  
3 into situations where the contact management, the  
4 number of contacts operating around a submarine force  
5 is greater than it has ever been before.

6 We are operating in areas now where there are  
7 literally scores of contacts in close proximity to our  
8 ships, and they have to be able to handle much more --  
9 many more contacts in close proximity to the submarine  
10 in past years, much more difficult problem, so we have  
11 a tremendous effort in progress to try to come up with  
12 mechanical and automated systems to ease the burden on  
13 the operator to do all this analysis himself, and there  
14 is no simple fix.

15 We have the smartest people in the world in  
16 this arena studying this to come up with answers. So,  
17 in order to do this job, and I would agree with you, if  
18 there was an automated thing we would go get it, but in  
19 order to continue to operate the submarine force, it is  
20 going to continue in the near future anyway to require  
21 brain power in that process, you know, reasonable  
22 conscious people who know what to expect from contact  
23 motion to do analysis of the safety of the surface  
24 picture prior to proceeding to shallow depth.

1           So, it is important then, if that is a given,  
2   it is important then to establish the proper atmosphere  
3   on the ship and the proper procedures in place to  
4   ensure that no single individual is the controlling  
5   factor of deciding to go to periscope depth, that it is  
6   a team process, that there are one or two or three  
7   people in the chain, and they all get a nod in  
8   agreement that the situation is, in fact, safe.

9           In no circumstances, I can tell you almost  
10   assuredly, unless it is a casualty situation, an  
11   emergency requiring immediate surfacing of the boat for  
12   survival, that no officer of the deck in any of the  
13   submarines in this force or the one in the Atlantic  
14   would ever go to periscope depth without the full  
15   concurrence and assent of his commanding officer, and  
16   that is part of the check.

17           He, the commanding officer in our setup, the  
18   officer of the deck does the initial analysis with his  
19   team of people in the control room using the machinery,  
20   the plotting, the mental analysis of those people, the  
21   machinery analysis to make an assessment that it is  
22   safe, and then it is his job to convince the captain in  
23   the proper setup, it is his job to convince the captain  
24   that it is, in fact, safe to go to periscope depth, and

1 the captain has to assent to that, make an independent  
2 analysis with all of his experience, at that point 15  
3 years of operating submarines, his own experience of  
4 getting the boat up to periscope depth.

5 MR. STRAUCH: One of the things that I kind  
6 of see in this accident is that, you know, given, as  
7 you know, the fallibility of this process, on the day  
8 of the accident, if anything, it appears as if somebody  
9 or somehow obstacles were put into proper  
10 decisionmaking at the time of the event.

11 I mean not only was it a key source of  
12 information out of commission, but there was one fewer  
13 sonar operators in there than there should have been,  
14 and a critical element of presenting information to the  
15 CO was unavailable because there were civilians in  
16 between the FTOW, his station, and where the CEP was  
17 displayed.

18 On top of that you have the inevitable  
19 distraction of a bunch of civilians in a very, very  
20 crowded environment during what is a pretty -- a  
21 potentially very challenging evolution

22 CAPT KYLE: I can comment on that, if you  
23 will.

24 MR. STRAUCH: Please.

1           CAPT KYLE: Again, this is more or less  
2     opinion. You know, I am just going to give you my  
3     benefit of a lot of riding submarines and watching  
4     people do this stuff. Some of this I can't verify yet  
5     because some of these guys aren't talking.

6           I would love to be able to take the CO and XO  
7     aside and officer of the deck aside, just tell me what  
8     happened, so it is somewhat speculation, and I am going  
9     to say that in advance, but the situation here,  
10    clearly, when that remote sonar or pager was down, went  
11    out of commission.

12           In my mind, as I think I said on the boat we  
13    walked through the other day, in my mind, that would be  
14    a big deal, because to me that is a critical piece of  
15    equipment for me. That is what I depend on, depended  
16    on for years to do my independent evaluation either as  
17    driving the boat as officer of the deck, or as a CO of  
18    the boat, or even in the post-CO days when I was up  
19    there as a senior rider on the boat, senior as a  
20    squadron commander watching the ship go, I would  
21    always, you know, going to periscope depth, I would  
22    look at that and see if it was safe to go to periscope  
23    depth. You know, that is just my job.

24           Without that piece of equipment on board, the

1 standard procedure for our boats is to write a  
2 mitigating set of instructions. The commanding  
3 officer, somebody would -- the commanding officer would  
4 sign the set of instructions that says with this piece  
5 of equipment out of commission, here are the special  
6 rules or procedures that we will employ until we get  
7 this equipment back. We refer to that as a temporary  
8 standing order.

9 In this case, because it was only a day  
10 cruise, it was only going to be out for a few hours, I  
11 think they departed from that formality.

12 There is no question in my mind, my suspicion  
13 is if this had been an underway of a week or 10 days or  
14 a month or something, and this equipment was down, this  
15 boat would have written a temporary standing order to  
16 cover that situation, and they would have had that in  
17 effect and thought about how they were going to  
18 mitigate that casualty.

19 But I think, my suspicion again, guess, that,  
20 geez, we have just get to get through this day, we are  
21 busy right now getting all this stuff done, we don't  
22 have time to write the standing order, we will just  
23 compensate for it for the time being, and the captain  
24 probably had in his mind some procedure that he was

1 going to use to compensate, and he was just going to  
2 take care of it.

3           Regarding the block plot by the people who  
4 were standing there, in practicality, in combination  
5 with the sonar equipment out of commission, in my mind,  
6 if I was to write one of those standing orders,  
7 temporary standing orders, I would -- that would be a  
8 central element in what the mitigation would be -- I  
9 would default to the CEP plot if I was writing that  
10 standing order, and say we will use the CEP plot in the  
11 meantime, and it will be maintained in such a such a  
12 fashion, and it will be, you know, be our central  
13 contact analysis station.

14           But that doesn't mean that that is the only  
15 way you can do it. There are modes in the combat  
16 system that he can go and get that same information  
17 that will be presented on that CEP plot. Whether he  
18 did or not, I don't know if he went over and even  
19 looked at that, but that information, he needed to do,  
20 the contact analysis was available on the combat  
21 system, displaying all the contacts and the bearing  
22 versus time to do that analysis.

23           Or he could go into sonar. As I understand  
24 it, he did go into sonar, and the XO went into sonar to

1 look at this, because for he looked on the ASBDU is  
2 exactly what is presented in sonar anyway, he can do  
3 the same analysis by walking into the sonar room.

4 So, the fact that that equipment was down is  
5 significant in its immediate right, but that is not --  
6 it is not a show-stopper. You have a way to work  
7 around that. It is not -- it is not -- it is not a  
8 problem.

9 Now, what was the central issue, why did this  
10 break down? I think the real issue is not so much the  
11 visitors. The visitors were probably at some -- their  
12 present on board was a driver, but those 16 folks that  
13 were distributed in that control room, would it have  
14 been better if they hadn't been there? Probably, but  
15 again, was that a show-stopper? No. We have taken  
16 visitors out to sea many times safely, more visitors  
17 than that, been in control, and you can operate the  
18 ship safely. That is not, that in itself is not a  
19 driving issue either.

20 We have had military people, that many  
21 military people in control. When we operate the ship  
22 at battles stations, there is more people than that  
23 than 16 in control, and yet we can operate the ship in  
24 a combat situation with more than 16 people in there.

1 That is required, that is the stations.

2 So, the number of folks that were in there,  
3 in its own right, is not the issue either. The real  
4 issue on this thing is for some reason, the commanding  
5 officer, in my opinion again, the commanding officer  
6 felt some sense of urgency to get on with the agenda,  
7 to get the ship going, headed home, to catch up with  
8 the schedule.

9 Whereas, we like to have this two-party  
10 check, the officer of the deck proposing I think it is  
11 safe to go to periscope depth, captain, this is the  
12 reason why I am justifying why it is safe, in de facto,  
13 he was cut out of the loop, and the captain  
14 independently was making these decisions to go to  
15 periscope depth.

16 He was driving in his junior to senior  
17 relationship, senior to junior relationship, that  
18 officer of the deck, and muting, effectively muting his  
19 independent analysis of the contact situation, and he  
20 captain's judgment as to the safety of the situation  
21 topside and the adequacy of the maneuvers and required  
22 to do the analysis was faulty.

23 He did not do an adequate analysis of the  
24 sonar situation, and he did not do an adequate analysis

1 of the visual picture once he got to periscope depth to  
2 assess the safety to conduct the emergency main ballast  
3 tank blow.

4 We lost -- we lost the dual party check, and  
5 as you said, any given person can make an improper  
6 judgment. Unfortunately, in this case, it was the  
7 senior guy, and he was -- that exact incident, that  
8 exact issue, the danger of falling into that trap was  
9 the subject of repeated discussions at that PCO's  
10 course when I would teach that course, because  
11 personally, my personality is very prone to recall that  
12 single man, one-man show. You are the one-man show,  
13 you are doing it all, and my personality is such that  
14 it is very easy for that to happen to me.

15 It happened to me in my command tour, I had  
16 to be very, very cautious that I did not override the  
17 judgment and the feedback of my juniors in making  
18 decisions of command level, command level decisions.

19 I am sure if I asked the current PCO  
20 instruction, Captain Neiderhouser [ph], that same  
21 discussion is happening today in that class up on the  
22 hill.

23 MR. STRAUCH: I think if we had time, we  
24 could talk about some of the human factors issues of

1 conspicuity of a white hull against a white background  
2 when there are waves splashing, and we could talk about  
3 some of the other issues, but I do want to ask you a  
4 couple of questions in regard to what you said.

5 With your knowledge of the situation, in your  
6 opinion, did the captain violate any written procedures  
7 by not fulfilling -- and I am not sure what the term is  
8 -- a temporary order because the ASBDU [?] was out?

9 CAPT KYLE: I don't think the fact that the  
10 ASBDU was out violated the procedures, I don't  
11 understand that, but he did not -- what is that?

12 CDR JOHNSON: Search techniques?

13 CAPT KYLE: How about the sealed standing  
14 orders? If we are going to periscope depth, how long  
15 does it say to stay on a leg?

16 CDR JOHNSON: I will have to pull it up and  
17 look at it specifically.

18 CAPT KYLE: Would you pull it out and take a  
19 look at it? The sealed standing orders discusses the  
20 preparations to go to periscope depth and what you  
21 should do, and it says you should analyze contacts on a  
22 given leg during passive analysis for a period of at  
23 least three minutes before you change course and check  
24 it on another leg, and he didn't spend three minutes

1       there.

2               I have a little graphic in my bag over there  
3       to show the difference in that. If he had stayed for  
4       three minutes on his initial leg of 3-4-0, if he had  
5       stayed there for three minutes, I think the fact that  
6       this contact, the Ehime Maru, would have been, the fact  
7       that he was close would have been unmistakable on any  
8       sonar display, any contact, any piece of equipment that  
9       was still in operation, it would have been absolutely  
10      indisputable and clear, and any of his operators in the  
11      control room would have seen that and raised his hand  
12      and say, hey, this contact is close.

13              So the three-minute, the lack of the  
14      three-minute leg in my mind was a significant deviation  
15      from procedure.

16              MR. STRAUCH: But you said something about  
17      filling out a piece of paper regarding a change in  
18      procedure or --

19              CAPT KYLE: Standing order.

20              MR. STRAUCH: Standing order, because the  
21      ASBDU was down.

22              CAPT KYLE: That is just -- that is just  
23      guidance to his watchstanders on how to compensate and  
24      mitigate. It kind of highlights to them, hey, this

1 significant piece of equipment is out of commission,  
2 and so for his watchstanders, this is how we are going  
3 to operate the boat with this equipment down.

4 MR. STRAUCH: It is guidance, but it is not  
5 required?

6 CAPT KYLE: Once it is signed, it is  
7 required.

8 MR. STRAUCH: But in terms of what the CO was  
9 supposed to do, it's guidance. In other words, the  
10 fact that he did not fill out the order, he did not  
11 violate a procedure.

12 CAPT KYLE: Well, I don't know, let's see, I  
13 have to think about that. What requires temporary  
14 standing orders?

15 CDR JOHNSON: My understanding, as commanding  
16 officer, was that I wrote temporary standing orders to  
17 ensure that my crew had my viewpoint, my precautions  
18 prior to exercising an evolution because some equipment  
19 was out of commission. The requirement for those  
20 temporary standing orders was more --

21 CAPT KYLE: Right. I don't know if there is  
22 a requirement that says --

23 CDR JOHNSON: There is no specific written  
24 requirement that says you have to write temporary

1 standing orders. It was good submarining practice.

2 CAPT KYLE: I am not sure there is, but I  
3 will tell you that is commonly it is not, that is a  
4 common practice.

5 MR. STRAUCH: Is there written procedures  
6 regarding how, you know, whether to slow up or speed up  
7 because you have to get back at a certain time because  
8 civilians are there, and they want to get back?

9 CAPT KYLE: No.

10 MR. STRAUCH: Are there any specific written  
11 procedures regarding what evolutions to perform or not  
12 to perform with civilians on board?

13 CAPT KYLE: No.

14 MR. STRAUCH: Should there be?

15 CAPT KYLE: Should there be - I will say  
16 possibly. There are certain procedures that are  
17 clearly -- clearly would -- you know, I don't know that  
18 that even would be helpful, but there are certain  
19 procedures that would not -- that would just be beyond  
20 judgment, beyond -- be totally out of, you know, some  
21 drills we do, some casualty procedures that we do, and  
22 propulsion plant stuff. I just can't imagine anybody  
23 would ever in their right mind think of doing some of  
24 those things with a civilian on board.

1           I mean that would not be -- you know, so I  
2   don't know. That will be the subject of a lot of  
3   thought and discussion whether we have written  
4   procedures on that.

5           MR. STRAUCH: It sounds like as a result of  
6   the Houston accident, that there was a change in not  
7   doing those kinds of evolutions in the Los Angeles  
8   area, but even that wasn't put in writing, is that  
9   correct, in your understanding?

10          CAPT KYLE: I can't say that for sure. All I  
11   am saying what they did in the Houston accident was  
12   they made a conscious scheduling decision not to  
13   operate off Los Angeles. That was the decision at the  
14   command level at the oversight, that Los Angeles is not  
15   a flight training area, we are not going to go up there  
16   and do major naval exercises or operate in a long  
17   period of time right off of Los Angeles.

18          But that is -- that is still a common  
19   decision, but I don't know that it was ever written  
20   down or it's -- there is not a prohibition of sending a  
21   submarine up there. If there is a need to send one up  
22   there, we will send a submarine up there, but that is  
23   not going to be a place that we can continuously  
24   operate.

1           MR. STRAUCH: Do you think as a result of  
2 this accident there should be a prohibition against  
3 performing of training maneuvers off the coast of  
4 Hawaii?

5           CAPT KYLE: No.

6           MR. STRAUCH: Why not?

7           CAPT KYLE: Because there is nothing  
8 inherently dangerous in doing training maneuvers off  
9 the coast of Hawaii. We have done thousands of hours  
10 of training operations off the coast of Hawaii,  
11 thousands, safely, without any incident, without any  
12 problem.

13           We have thousands of hours of operation off  
14 the cost of Southern California, off of San Diego,  
15 without a problem, without incident, and it is  
16 necessary, it is absolutely necessary for the continued  
17 training of our submarine force to do those operations  
18 in the proximity of the land, because that is where we  
19 do our business in wartime, and that is where we do our  
20 business on deployment.

21           So, in order to get that training, we have to  
22 be able to operate off the coast of land.

23           MR. STRAUCH: And even if that training  
24 includes emergency blows just a couple miles off the

1 coast of a fairly busy port?

2 CAPT KYLE: Yes. It can be done safely.  
3 There is no reason why it cannot be done in a safe  
4 manner off the coasts of any reasonable place. Now,  
5 keep in mind in this particular day, although they were  
6 nine miles off of Honolulu, there was not a heavy  
7 contact incident event that day. There were only two  
8 or three contacts to contact this tracking. That is a  
9 pretty low number, and two of them, even after the ship  
10 was surfaced, were not even visible. They were out a  
11 long ways away from the ship. There was nobody else  
12 out there to even render rescue assistance to the  
13 casualty, so there was one guy out there, and that is  
14 well within the capacity of the ship if they had  
15 followed procedures to handle that contact, and to have  
16 conducted this evolution in a safe manner.

17 So, you know, the practice, if everything had  
18 gone right, they would have seen this contact and said,  
19 oh, this guy is close, let's relocate or wait until he  
20 goes by and make a conscious decision we will go over  
21 here, leave this guy behind, go to some other place  
22 where there isn't somebody, and it could have been done  
23 perfectly safely.

24 MR. STRAUCH: In your opinion, would there

1 have been the same kind of emphasis to hurry back if  
2 there had not been civilians on board? I guess what I  
3 am getting at is if there had only been strictly the  
4 ship's crew on board, and they would have been delayed,  
5 and they would have had to have spent overnight, would  
6 that have been a big deal to the crew?

7 CAPT KYLE: That was the proximate source of  
8 the feeling of urgency on the part of the commanding  
9 officer, so in that fact, in that matter, civilians did  
10 have an impact on this particular event because they  
11 were there, and because there was an agenda there, they  
12 were the focus of this operation.

13 You could go and say, gee, if the civilians  
14 weren't there, the ship wouldn't have gotten underway,  
15 I mean -- and we wouldn't have had the accident, and  
16 that is true, if they hadn't been, that is the only  
17 reason the ship got underway to go to sea that day, the  
18 Greeneville did, was to take these civilians out, but  
19 because there was an urgency to complete the evolution  
20 on time, that did drive, I think, was a contributing  
21 factor.

22 Now, it could have been any event. There are  
23 other things that could have driven that same sense of  
24 urgency - desire to get back before sundown. Gee, I

1 really don't want to go into port after dark, and if I  
2 don't make sundown, I will have to stay overnight, I  
3 don't want to go in at night, I won't be allowed to go  
4 in at night, or something like that will come up, and  
5 that has driven COs to make poor judgment decisions  
6 because they are trying to get there before the sun  
7 goes down, and whatever agenda they were on, got  
8 delayed for whatever reason, and as a result, they kind  
9 of hurried up to get back in time.

10 I can remember in that drowning and collision  
11 presentation, the ship I was on before I got there ran  
12 aground off San Diego because they were in a hurry to  
13 get back to San Diego before dark, and the CO, in that  
14 sense, just drove the ship too hard to try to make that  
15 timeline rather than slowing down and saying we are not  
16 going to make it tonight, we are going to go in  
17 tomorrow morning.

18 Those things are like that, it could be  
19 anything that drives the agenda. It happens to be in  
20 this particular case, the fact we wanted to get the  
21 civilians back by 1600 or whatever and we got a little  
22 behind schedule, so that is an issue in that respect,  
23 the timeline.

24 MR. STRAUCH: And inconveniencing the crew

1       versus inconveniencing civilians, what effect would it  
2       have had if it would have been just the ship's crew  
3       having to be inconvenienced by spending an extra night  
4       that they hadn't planned on?

5               CAPT KYLE:  It would have been a driver  
6       nonetheless.  It may not have been as strong a driver,  
7       but he would have not wanted -- I think in this case, I  
8       am really socking at supposition here -- but it wasn't  
9       a nighttime deal was not the factor here.  He had an  
10      agenda to be back at -- I think at 1400, and an  
11      approach point to Pearl Harbor pierside at 1500.

12             There is plenty of daylight yet, so he was  
13      really, he was really -- the civilian schedule was  
14      probably driving this particular case.  They could have  
15      easily, if it had just been the crew out there, he  
16      could have called up and said I can't make 1500, can I  
17      come in at 1600, and they would have -- he would have  
18      gotten permission to come in a little late.  That is  
19      fairly commonly done, something happens, you can't make  
20      it, just call up and say I need to come in a little  
21      late.

22             MR. STRAUCH:  The last question I have is one  
23      of the kind of curious things I think we have all  
24      learned in the last couple of days is that the Navy

1 seems to have a fairly punitive approach to error in  
2 its tactical environment, and that goes against current  
3 thinking in the field of human error investigations,  
4 which takes -- doesn't look at the person committing  
5 the error so much as the context of the error and the  
6 events that led to that error. If anything, I think  
7 their thinking is that taking a punitive approach could  
8 disguise some of the antecedents to error and make it  
9 even more likely that errors, similar errors would  
10 occur in the future.

11 Would you care to comment on that?

12 CAPT KYLE: I understand what you are saying,  
13 however, the long-standing belief in the Navy, and it's  
14 a fundamental principle, is that those responsible are  
15 held accountable for their errors.

16 If they err significantly, they will be held  
17 accountable. Now, I don't think, on the other hand, I  
18 think that the Navy has softened in that respect.  
19 There was a period of time when one strike and you are  
20 out. In this case, many, many cases of, you know, a  
21 second chance mentality and, you know, there is no  
22 scapegoat. I mean you made a mistake, learn the  
23 lessons, get back in there and keep on going.

24 This is a very, very serious incident, and

1     there will be probably -- there will be obviously a  
2     litigatory investigation.  However, I don't think, I  
3     really don't believe that -- I do believe, I guess, is  
4     a better way to say it, more positively, is that  
5     getting to the source of the problem, the root of the  
6     issue, what is the bottom line cause is something we  
7     also do fairly well at.  We will find, we will  
8     determine what the bottom line cause of this accident  
9     was, and not just pin it on one guy's bad judgment and  
10    say his bad judgment, we will take him out, and  
11    therefore, the organization is back to -- is okay.

12               We understand that there are root causes  
13    here, programmatic issues that we need to look at - how  
14    did this happen, what was the circumstances that were  
15    allowed to occur on that ship that took a well-trained  
16    officer and allowed him to make -- more than one  
17    officer really -- several well-trained people, allowed  
18    them to make a poor judgment, and that is always in the  
19    back of our mind is how, what environment was existing  
20    on that day, despite all this good training we gave  
21    this guy, and years of experience he had, how did this  
22    still happen, what things were missing, how did we put  
23    him in this circumstance, and we will get to the bottom  
24    of that, there is no doubt in my mind that we will,

1 because that's what everybody is wondering, because  
2 everybody knows Commander Waddle and his team know what  
3 they are supposed to do, and they are probably going  
4 through infinite recriminations at this point, why, I  
5 know what I was supposed to do, why didn't I do it.

6 In some fact or another, we, you know, put  
7 him in a circumstance where his training was -- didn't  
8 protect him. I mean he deviated from established  
9 procedures and training, and the stuff he has been  
10 trained to do for some reason, there is some motivation  
11 there, something that drove him to do that, and we have  
12 got to understand that.

13 MR. STRAUCH: Thank you, Captain.

14 CAPT KYLE: Here is the document on the ship  
15 itself for clearing baffles, preparation to go to  
16 periscope. Stay on course 150 feet until there is  
17 enough data on the ASBDU and the time-bearing mode on  
18 Mark 81-2 displays, which is the back-up, ASBDU is  
19 down, but the time-bearing mode of the Mark 81-2 is  
20 still available, to determine accurate bearing rate in  
21 the direction of relative motion (about 3 minutes).

22 If deemed appropriate, recommend use of  
23 active sonar, usually [inaudible] during baffle clear  
24 when operating in vicinity of fishing vessels or

1 trawlers. Decision to use [inaudible] active sonar for  
2 baffle clear must be predicated on favorable  
3 environment utilizing the guidance of Article 0511 of a  
4 different standing order. That is really the  
5 environmental conditions, doesn't make sense.

6 In addition, pay particular attention to  
7 doppler 9 intercepts and any context heard on the  
8 racks, which is the underwater telephone. Change  
9 course at least to 120 degrees, normally, at 10 knots,  
10 to clear the previously baffled area.

11 Try to select a course that will produce a  
12 maximum speed across the line of sight while  
13 maintaining the number of maneuvers necessary to get  
14 two legs -- minimize the number of maneuvers necessary  
15 to get two legs on the contacts.

16 In general, select a course change that does  
17 not put the contact in the baffles, so that it  
18 demonstrates a trace on the screen and the effect of  
19 ship's changing speed across the line of sight can be  
20 monitored.

21 Conservatively estimate the contact's range  
22 based on his bearing rate, fire control, and plot  
23 solution.

24 This is his own writing.

1 MR. STRAUCH: How can we get that?

2 CAPT KYLE: You can have -- we can take this.

3 I don't see that there is anything on this page that  
4 is --

5 MR. STRAUCH: The previous page begins the  
6 classification.

7 CAPT KYLE: It says "C" here, but I am  
8 telling you I don't see -- I will look at this and see  
9 if this is classified.

10 Assure the sonar contacts on the right are  
11 drawing right, and those on the left are drawing left,  
12 or that they are drawing astern whenever possible.  
13 Achieve this condition with your closest contacts. If  
14 the tactical situation is not of concern, take a course  
15 for best depth control.

16 In this regard, unless a safety course is  
17 prescribed, returning to base course after radiated  
18 noise -- oh, this is a different page.

19 CDR CACCIVIO: The request for that CO  
20 standing orders was made. It is on the required list.

21 It is currently in -- it says the whole group of all  
22 the documents being evaluated for declassification, and  
23 Mr. Roth-Roffy asked that if we removed any enclosures  
24 due to classification, that we simply provide the

1 index, so he could identify what was removed, and so we  
2 are continuing down the path that is on the list.

3 MR. STRAUCH: The standing offers refer to  
4 the -- does that refer to the written guidance that I  
5 was asking about?

6 CAPT KYLE: Yes, at least our understanding  
7 was. Returning to base course after reaching periscope  
8 is generally preferable. When on a steady course,  
9 sonar search completed, and it is clear to ascend,  
10 inform the commanding officer the status and  
11 preparations to bring the ship to periscope depth  
12 routine evolutions planned, periscope depth, and all  
13 sonar contacts. Request permission to proceed to  
14 periscope depth. All that is in here. That is exactly  
15 how it is supposed to be done.

16 LT JOHNSON: Captain, Lieutenant Johnson of  
17 the U.S. Coast Guard. I have a couple of questions, if  
18 I may. I am going to be asking you questions based on  
19 information I know you do not have. These are from  
20 interviews with Lieutenant JG Coen and Captain Waddle  
21 or Commander Waddle shortly after from a training  
22 aspect.

23 Lieutenant JG Coen indicated in his  
24 post-casualty interview that there certainly was a

1 concern for the PH time, as well as the availability of  
2 good dive water, 10,000 yards was all that they had in  
3 their northerly course, and they were concerned about  
4 being able to complete the evolution with good dive  
5 water.

6 Your thoughts on how that might drive them to  
7 do it quickly. I know some of this information is new  
8 to you.

9 CAPT KYLE: I have not reviewed -- I know  
10 what that is referring to is the dive water -- they  
11 have assigned areas of deconfliction with other  
12 submarines where they are allowed to operate. So, this  
13 is another urgency thing that is, in my mind, is  
14 baloney. You know, it should not be an urgency thing.

15 If you are not comfortable with the area, he can move  
16 the ship to a different place, and not be driven to  
17 this area boundary.

18 He is not allowed to be submerged north of  
19 such and such a line, and so when he turned to the  
20 north, he had to get the blow done, so he is on the  
21 surface, and therefore, quote, unquote "legal" to  
22 operate, and in my opinion, another bad reason to make  
23 a decision.

24 So, that is another driver that I was unaware

1 of that was another incentive to get going with the  
2 procedure in a hurry that is somewhat bogus.

3 CDR CACCIVIO: Like I say, I know this is new  
4 and you haven't been aware of it. As a matter of fact,  
5 I just rediscovered my interview sheet yesterday from  
6 this gentleman.

7 When the commanding officer, according to the  
8 interview with Lieutenant Coen, made a decision to go  
9 to periscope depth, he informed the OD give me the  
10 periscope depth, and you have got five minutes to do  
11 it.

12 That is according to his interview. Is that  
13 a common thing?

14 CAPT KYLE: That supports exactly what I was  
15 just saying. The commanding officer was driving the  
16 OD. That is exactly what I was just telling you.

17 CDR CACCIVIO: Do you think that the presence  
18 of the chief of the staff had anything to do with that,  
19 or it was scheduling, or it was the visitors, or a  
20 combination of all of them?

21 CAPT KYLE: It was not the chief of staff.  
22 It is exactly what I just said a minute ago. He wanted  
23 to finish this program on schedule, make a good  
24 impression of his ship to his visitors, get back on

1 time, and not inconvenience those people.

2 CDR CACCIVIO: Normally, does the commanding  
3 officer allow the officer of the deck to take as much  
4 time as he needs to get to periscope depth?

5 CAPT KYLE: Absolutely. The minute you say I  
6 have to get there in five minutes, you have just -- you  
7 have just violated Rule 1, which is you have eliminated  
8 that independent thinking of the officer of the deck.  
9 He can't make those -- he is a Lieutenant JG, for  
10 Pete's sake, he has been doing this business for six  
11 months or something, and he is not in the same level,  
12 he doesn't have the same experience to fall back on, on  
13 contact management, that a guy with 15 years of  
14 submarining experience can do, can look at the contacts  
15 and make judgments very quickly based on what he has  
16 seen because he has seen it gazillion times. This  
17 lieutenant has probably seen -- done this maybe 10  
18 times in his life, and to say you have got to get it  
19 done in five minutes is an unreasonable request.

20 CDR JOHNSON: Can I add something real quick?

21 CAPT KYLE: Five minutes, the five minutes  
22 put the urgency sense in Lieutenant Coen's heart, I  
23 have got to get this done in a hurry, and so he is  
24 going to be more inclined to say -- to say he is ready

1 when he is really not ready.

2 CDR CACCIVIO: Through Lieutenant Coen's  
3 interview, he made numerous, and I do mean numerous  
4 references to the control room was very crowded and it  
5 was very confusing in there. I don't remember this, I  
6 don't know that it was very confusing, it was very  
7 crowded. He continued to say that the entire time.

8 Is an officer of the deck expected, if he  
9 feels like he's -- and I don't want to use the term --  
10 how do I say this -- I don't want to use the term  
11 losing control of the situation or being overwhelmed by  
12 the factor -- is he free enough to express that to the  
13 commanding officer, "Captain, I am uncomfortable, I  
14 need to get some people out of here, I need more help  
15 in here?"

16 CAPT KYLE: You would hope so. You would  
17 hope so, and --

18 CDR CACCIVIO: He wouldn't suffer -- he would  
19 not suffer anything on a fit rep or any reprimand from  
20 the commanding officer for doing that, would he?

21 CAPT KYLE: I would hope no. I mean I have  
22 personally served with commanding officers in days of  
23 old, in the bad old days where they were pretty hard  
24 over guys that were pretty -- the personality was sort

1 of A type, A++ type personalities, and if you didn't  
2 make them happy, they would take your face off in a  
3 second, but -- but knowing Commander Waddle, he is not  
4 that type of person, he is not the kind of guy who is  
5 going to unload on somebody.

6 I think if Lieutenant Coen had said I need to  
7 get some people out of here, these guys are bothering  
8 me, I think -- I think it would have been, especially  
9 with the chief of staff there, he would have been  
10 sensitive to that, the captain would have been  
11 sensitive to it, and they would have done, you know,  
12 mitigated the situation for him, or maybe got his more  
13 senior officer of the deck up there, you know, he was  
14 more comfortable with that.

15 CDR CACCIVIO: Do you think that the captain  
16 would have been aware that this was the first time that  
17 Lieutenant Coen had ever participated in an EMBT blow?

18 Should the captain have known that this is an officer  
19 who has never done this evolution before or possibly  
20 not?

21 CAPT KYLE: I don't know if he should have  
22 known, I don't know. I don't know that I would have  
23 remembered that if I was the CO, have you ever done  
24 this before, I mean the EMBT blow procedure itself is

1 not particularly complicated.

2 CDR CACCIVIO: On the scope, Lieutenant Coen  
3 indicated that he, when the scope broke the water, he  
4 did three quick sweeps, and the captain took the scope  
5 away from him. Those were his words. He never had a  
6 chance to do a low power, a slow search and low power  
7 for contacts. He did his three turns in a hurry, and  
8 as a matter of fact, on the first turn, the scope was  
9 experiencing some wave slap. He said it may have  
10 actually submerged, I don't remember, but I know it was  
11 taking water over it. I got three sweeps. The captain  
12 said, "Let me have the scope," and he never got a  
13 chance to look in low power.

14 I don't want to say is that normal, but would  
15 the captain normally allow the officer of the deck to  
16 satisfy himself as the OD that he, in fact, of the  
17 contact picture, with a good, slow search prior to  
18 taking the scope from him?

19 CAPT KYLE: You have got to remember the  
20 reason why we were going to periscope depth in the  
21 first place, what was the purpose. The purpose was to  
22 get a good visual search done.

23 CDR CACCIVIO: Sure, exactly.

24 CAPT KYLE: That's the whole reason we went

1 to periscope depth, so it is not normal unless, you  
2 know, there are cases, tactical cases where the  
3 commanding officer would -- you know if he felt that  
4 the situation required the captain's immediate judgment  
5 on the tactical situation on the surface, then, the  
6 captain, it's not unusual for the captain to take the  
7 boat to periscope depth, so he could see immediately,  
8 with his own eye, what the tactical picture was.

9 In combat situations, that is normal. He  
10 would take the boat up to periscope depth because you  
11 can't afford to -- you know, you are in a combat  
12 situation where the length of exposure of the periscope  
13 could mean impending attack on your own ship, so you  
14 would not typically have a six-month qualified OD take  
15 the boat to periscope depth in combat.

16 So, that is sort of the end of the spectrum,  
17 but there is conditions short of that, that you might  
18 come up with and say I will take the boat to periscope  
19 depth because I want to see the situation immediately.

20 CDR CACCIVIO: Right. I haven't had the  
21 opportunity to see any of the actual deck logs or  
22 anything. Lieutenant Coen mentions in here after he  
23 came on watch, and while they were doing some of the  
24 deep water stuff, they were in the process of shooting

1 water slugs, demonstration for the guests.

2           Having been out there, I kind of know, but  
3 could you describe the impact that may have on sonar  
4 being able to acquire and maintain track of passive  
5 contacts during this evolution?

6           CAPT KYLE: Shooting water slugs only lasts  
7 about -- the whole event is over with in about 10  
8 seconds. It's a momentary loss - it will affect the  
9 sonar's ability to search for about 10 seconds, because  
10 it's a loud noise just behind the sonar itself, but it  
11 is not a significant impact on the overall searching  
12 capability.

13           CDR CACCIVIO: Capability is immediately  
14 restored after that?

15           CAPT KYLE: Immediately restored right after  
16 it is done.

17           CDR CACCIVIO: In your experience as a  
18 captain, is it common when they announce that they are  
19 shooting water slugs for sonarmen sometimes to take  
20 their headsets off because they don't actually know the  
21 exact time they are going to shoot them to keep from --

22           CAPT KYLE: What I have seen in most cases,  
23 they will turn down the volume on their headphone, and  
24 they will keep listening, but they will just turn down

1 the -- they have a volume control right there on their  
2 console. We rarely found people taking off their  
3 headphones.

4 CDR CACCIVIO: Oh, yes, I just have seen  
5 that, when they don't know exactly when they are going  
6 to pull the trigger.

7 CAPT KYLE: That's on the bone fish

8 CDR CACCIVIO: Yes, sir. Ooh, that hurt.

9 The captain mentioned in his interview that  
10 they did have a contact at 340 that faded, and it  
11 appears, and I don't know that we asked him, this was a  
12 very emotional interview at the time, and then didn't  
13 think it's appropriate to ask questions at that time,  
14 that there was no attempt to reestablish this contact.

15 In you being a former CO of submarine, if you  
16 were going to maneuver your vessel in the direction of  
17 a contact that you had faded and gone through the CMBT  
18 evolution, would it be prudent to try to reestablish  
19 that contact to ascertain any type of range information  
20 you may have?

21 CAPT KYLE: The contact at 340, he was doing  
22 his major clear going to periscope depth and everything  
23 at course 120. 340 had put that contact in the port  
24 baffles.

1 CDR CACCIVIO: Yes, I am talking about after  
2 he finished that and was actually conducting his  
3 emergency deep just prior to blowing.

4 CAPT KYLE: He is still in the baffles.

5 CDR CACCIVIO: He altered course in the  
6 transition, the left full rudder to course.

7 CAPT KYLE: 340.

8 CDR CACCIVIO: 340. So, he is coming back to  
9 that area.

10 CAPT KYLE: Right to that side, but he has  
11 also increased speed.

12 CDR CACCIVIO: Yes, sir.

13 CAPT KYLE: And it is incumbent upon him, you  
14 know, in my experience again, is to go through each  
15 contact that you have on the sonar, and that is why you  
16 are using passive sonar. It is the most sensitive.  
17 You are most likely to detect any contact on the  
18 passive sonar system. That's the most sensitive  
19 sensor.

20 CDR CACCIVIO: Yes, sir.

21 CAPT KYLE: For the longest range. So, you  
22 would go down, you would take a look at all those  
23 contacts and either resolve in your mind that the  
24 target, the contact, and the sonar, held in the sonar

1 at such a range that it is not going to be visible, or  
2 if it is visible -- even if it isn't, you would look  
3 down at each bearing of each sonar contact to see if I  
4 can see them. If it is clear from the sonar analysis,  
5 the contact is at 20 miles, you are not going to see  
6 that contact with your periscope. If it's within  
7 10,000 yards, within 5 miles, you should be able to see  
8 them. You need to go, continue to search until you see  
9 where that contact is.

10 CDR CACCIVIO: Yes, sir. In the last  
11 question I have for you, Captain, the fire control  
12 solutions that are generated and updated, is there any  
13 kind of permission or notification required of the  
14 officer of the deck if the fire control technician is  
15 to change that solution, to update that solution that  
16 you are aware of?

17 CAPT KYLE: Not in a normal steaming watch.  
18 That is his job to maintain the system solution up to  
19 date, but it is incumbent upon him to notify the  
20 commanding officer of any, or the officer of the deck,  
21 of any contacts that appear to be threatening given the  
22 set to periscope depth or close CPAs, and when I say  
23 "close CPAs," I mean CPA within 4,000 yards or so of  
24 the ship.

1 CDR CACCIVIO: Thank you, Captain, that is  
2 all the questions I have.

3 MR. WHITE: I would like to take a brief  
4 break at this moment.

5 [Off the record.]

6 MR. WHITE: We are back with our interview of  
7 Captain Kyle, and I believe Lieutenant Kusano had a  
8 question.

9 LTJG KUSANO: This is Lieutenant Kusano.  
10 Good morning, Captain.

11 CAPT KYLE: Good morning.

12 LTJG KUSANO: I guess I will just bring kind  
13 of a general perspective and former OD on a surface  
14 ship.

15 You mentioned the captain driving the ship  
16 and how dangerous that would be. Have you ever heard  
17 the term, "I am just a parrot on the bridge?"

18 CAPT KYLE: No, I haven't heard that, but I  
19 know what you mean. The captain is issuing all the  
20 orders, and you are just relaying, you are just a  
21 mouthpiece of the captain.

22 LTJG KUSANO: You mentioned where ODs should  
23 know better to speak out if there is a dangerous  
24 situation. In your experience as commanding officer,

1       how often did that ever happen?

2               CAPT KYLE:  It takes a -- the problem with it  
3       is most junior officers, if they know is wrong in their  
4       heart of hearts will tell -- you know, they will tell a  
5       captain I don't think that is right, but if there is a  
6       doubt in their mind, you know, that is what I worry  
7       about, if there is doubt in his mind, he will say,  
8       well, I don't feel comfortable with this, but the  
9       captain feels comfortable, so he has a lot of  
10      experience, I will go with it, and that is the  
11      dangerous part, because he won't answer the doubt.

12             I mean if it is clearly something the captain  
13      is forgetting, that doesn't bother me so much because  
14      most people will say, hey, you forgot to consider this.

15      This is obviously something wrong.  He will probably  
16      raise his hand and say, you know, point at it and say  
17      this is wrong, because the officers are well trained,  
18      and they want to do the right thing, and they are  
19      trying, but it is that question, that question in their  
20      minds is gee, I am not that comfortable, but that is  
21      because I am not experienced, he has got all the  
22      experience, he has got 15 years ahead of me, it must be  
23      okay, the captain.  I trust the captain implicitly,  
24      he's my, you know, he's the captain, so I am not going

1 to talk to him about it.

2 LTJG KUSANO: I guess it would depend on the  
3 personality or how strong the officer of the deck or  
4 the JO is.

5 CAPT KYLE: Certainly, and the relationship  
6 between the captain and that individual.

7 LTJG KUSANO: Relationship. I have both a  
8 screamer and then I had a CO who was just mellow, just  
9 let the OD do the job. What I found interesting was a  
10 lot of accidents were always with COs on the bridge,  
11 and with knowing that, I know on the surface program  
12 they don't really teach us, hey, if you guys have a  
13 problem, you know, let your captain know, let your  
14 captain -- that was really not emphasized.

15 Do some JOs, when they go through their  
16 training, are they ever instructed, that kind of  
17 information?

18 CAPT KYLE: Yes, they are. We teach that  
19 repeatedly, that it is the team concept, everybody has  
20 a voice, and teaming is the way we succeed. As Advias  
21 Barrio [ph] was saying if you get down to a one-man  
22 show or a single person, you are only as good as that  
23 person is, and we know every person is fallible. There  
24 isn't anybody that doesn't make mistakes. That's a

1 human frailty, and if that is what you are depending  
2 on, is one person, some mistakes will happen. So it's  
3 double-check.

4 All of our procedures on the boat are based  
5 on double, two-person, the rig for dive, classic  
6 example, rig a boat for dive to get ready to submerge.

7 It's the First Petty Officer, second checker is an  
8 officer, and we go, we do everything double.

9 If we are going to hang a tag out to place a  
10 piece of equipment out of commission for maintenance,  
11 we will put, one person will hang the tag, the second  
12 person will double-check the tag. There is always two  
13 people in the line because we recognize the fact that  
14 any given person, that's just the way God made people,  
15 they are not perfect, and they all make mistakes, but  
16 we hope, and we are pretty confident that two people in  
17 a row will not make the same mistake.

18 LTJG KUSANO: Isn't it also there have been  
19 cases of experienced ODs saying in other accidents  
20 where they have just been quoted as saying in  
21 investigations, I will just let the CO drive the ship  
22 and let him get into trouble, I mean that is something  
23 that hopefully, it wouldn't happen, but do you think  
24 that is possible that something like that could happen

1       ever? I mean I hope it doesn't, but it has happened in  
2       surface fleet.

3               CAPT KYLE: I am sure -- I am sure there are  
4       people who have thought that way, you know, if you are  
5       under a -- especially a guy that is pretty hard to deal  
6       with, doesn't take criticism well, that there are cases  
7       where, you know, screw it, you know, it's his problem,  
8       it's his neck.

9               But I don't think that was the case here.  
10       That is not -- Commander Waddle was highly respected by  
11       his crew. I mean I think that becomes clear in anybody  
12       you have discussed this with, and there was not a case  
13       where they were trying to get him or not tell him about  
14       problems.

15              Now, I do want to point out, I would like to  
16       -- there were some questions during our break about  
17       this five-minute get to periscope depth thing. That is  
18       not -- that is not an unachievable effort. I mean I  
19       don't want to say that is not, you know, that there  
20       aren't conditions where getting to periscope depth in a  
21       fairly short order is not required, but that is  
22       unusual, and you certainly would not need that -- you  
23       know, you need all the people there kind of at working  
24       their best, you would probably not let -- you would

1     probably talk to the officer of the deck, we need to  
2     get to periscope depth in five minutes. What that  
3     really means is you drive the boat harder, you would  
4     use more power, you would turn rudder, you would turn  
5     the ship faster to get over to your second leg and your  
6     first leg. It doesn't mean you cut any of the  
7     requirements to go up, you still have to do all that  
8     stuff.

9             You still need to try to get two good legs,  
10     preferably up to 3 minutes, I know 3 plus 3, that is  
11     greater than 5, but you want -- ideally if you have  
12     been on a given course, that could count as your first  
13     leg, so you have got good data coming in, so you say I  
14     have got good data on this leg, I need to change course  
15     in a hurry, get over to the next leg, get 3 minutes of  
16     data, and get the periscope up.

17            What that means is expedite, move things  
18     fast, get on with it, and drive the issue hard to get  
19     up to periscope depth. That can be done, but what I  
20     was trying to say is that Commander Waddle, in making  
21     that statement, placed a sense of urgency, an  
22     unnecessary sense of urgency in this case, because  
23     there really was no tactical requirement to go up other  
24     than you say I am behind my schedule, put a sense of

1 urgency on the back of Lieutenant Coen, and whether he  
2 was capable or had the skills to execute that safely at  
3 a 5-minute, you know, aggressive trip to periscope  
4 depth, I don't know. I don't know his level of  
5 training.

6 He is a fairly junior OD, Lieutenant JG, I  
7 think a couple of months probably, 6, 5, 7, 8 months,  
8 something like that, he probably hasn't driven the ship  
9 that much, and so he is going to need help.

10 If you want to get up at 5 minutes, he is  
11 going to need help in doing the contact analysis to get  
12 up there that quickly.

13 LTJG KUSANO: One last question, sir. I  
14 guess from your experience, from your days of being an  
15 OD and junior officer to being a commanding officer,  
16 what would you say would allow a JO to speak out in an  
17 incident like this, would it be personality or what  
18 would be the most important factor, personality or  
19 experience?

20 CAPT KYLE: I can't say either one of those.  
21 You need both of those. Experience, personality, the  
22 personality is probably the strongest because if he  
23 knows that he is not experienced and has a forthcoming  
24 personality, you say, "Captain, I am over my head here,

1 I don't understand it."

2 And it is just, I can't emphasize that  
3 enough. I mean I can remember having these discussions  
4 with a lot of my ODs when I was a CO, I said, look, you  
5 know, I operated my ship out of San Diego, which is  
6 frankly a lot more traffic than here, certainly a lot  
7 more than three contacts held off Diamondhead, and, you  
8 know, we are trying to get to periscope depth, I  
9 repeatedly would tell these guys, say don't sit up here  
10 by yourself struggling to get to periscope depth, try  
11 to do these contacts. If you slow down and come up to  
12 150 feet to do this analysis, and you have got six or  
13 seven contacts, they are brand-new, that you have no  
14 tracking data on, that you are trying to resolve, call  
15 me immediately and we will come up and work the problem  
16 together. You know, we will go through this and work  
17 the problem.

18 During that process, it was always when I  
19 went up there, you would try to go and say I am going  
20 to let the guy do his job, and I will watch him do it,  
21 so you can advise him on courses to choose, and so  
22 forth, to optimize the trip. A lot of this is trying  
23 to figure out where do you want to go to drive the ship  
24 to get the most data, the most efficient data to

1 resolve the target picture.

2           So, I think to answer your question, that is  
3 long, roundabout, I am rambling here, but I think the  
4 personality is probably number one, and then -- because  
5 even if you don't have much experience, if you know you  
6 don't have the experience and you have the personality,  
7 you can say I am just a little uncomfortable with this,  
8 raise his hand, and get the help up there is the right  
9 way to go, and that is they way he is going to get the  
10 experience is by asking for help and get people to show  
11 him the procedures.

12           LTJG KUSANO: I guess I lied, sir. Based on  
13 the personality part, when they go through their  
14 initial interview to come into the sub program, during  
15 the interview process, what types of -- are they  
16 looking for certain types of personalities or --

17           CAPT KYLE: Oh, yeah.

18           LTJG KUSANO: -- is it more just knowledge  
19 based?

20           CAPT KYLE: No, it is definitely -- it is  
21 both. You have got to have the right knowledge, but  
22 you have also got to -- they put you in a stressful  
23 situation right there on the spot, and they check your  
24 reaction to stress and how you handle those kinds of

1 situations right off the bat.

2 They know the kind of personality. They have  
3 been doing these kind of interviews for almost 50 years  
4 now, and they know the kind of people they are looking  
5 for in terms of their reaction to the type of  
6 questioning and stuff they get when they come to the  
7 interviews.

8 LTJG KUSANO: Thank you, sir.

9 LT JOHNSON: Lieutenant Johnson with the  
10 United States Coast Guard. Captain, I have only two  
11 more questions for you.

12 I was thinking about a question I had asked  
13 you earlier about this 5-minute to periscope depth  
14 issue. In your experience, in your opinion, when would  
15 the most dangerous point in the transition be from 150  
16 feet to periscope depth?

17 CAPT KYLE: Just before getting to periscope  
18 depth.

19 LT JOHNSON: Why is that, sir?

20 CAPT KYLE: Because you are right there at  
21 the interface. You can't see, you don't have your  
22 visual sensor up. The ship, the submarine is in  
23 proximity to strike another ship, shallow enough to  
24 sail, it's just below the water line, you know, 10 or

1 12 feet down, and you are not seeing yet. That is the  
2 period you are most uncomfortable.

3 LT JOHNSON: You are pretty much vulnerable  
4 in the fact in that transition period there is a point  
5 in that where you are blind and people can't see you,  
6 other than your sonar data, you can't see them, they  
7 can't see you, but you are still in a collision --

8 CAPT KYLE: You are a navigation hazard. You  
9 are a navigation hazard to those other ships.

10 LT JOHNSON: Exactly. I thought about that  
11 after I asked the question, so in saying you have got  
12 five minutes to get to periscope depth, in all  
13 actuality, if a commanding officer tried to minimize  
14 the time in that dangerous transition area, in  
15 retrospect, to me, doesn't seem that uncommon or off  
16 the wall. Is that a fair statement?

17 CAPT KYLE: No, no, the 5 minutes to  
18 periscope depth is like starting from ground zero. He  
19 hasn't really started this detailed review of his  
20 contacts, he has to go through that process. He has to  
21 make the course change to make sure there is no  
22 contacts overhead.

23 The transition from 150 feet to periscope  
24 depth, I have an internal standard that it should not

1 take more than 3 minutes to do that. If it takes more  
2 than 3 minutes, there is something wrong in the  
3 training and procedures being done on a ship.

4 Sometimes thermal climb will do that to you.

5 You get to the point where as you are coming shallow,  
6 the temperature of the water changes. If it gets  
7 warmer, the boat gets heavier, and so as you are coming  
8 up, the boat suddenly starts to stall, because your  
9 overall buoyancy is reduced, and you get stalled, and  
10 that is not an uncommon process, and that is indicative  
11 of a faulty procedure or lack of training between the  
12 officer of the deck and the diving officer watch, and  
13 that is not a very safe thing because when you stall,  
14 typically, the thermal climb starts up there at 80 feet  
15 or something and right there is, it hits the barrier  
16 and the boat can't get up.

17 So, now the boat is sitting a 80-foot keel  
18 depth, the sail is 50 feet above, it's 30 feet below  
19 the water line, certainly a large ship could strike the  
20 ship, you can't see, and the boat is stalled there, and  
21 the only answer is to put on propulsion to push through  
22 that, put on more speed on the submarine to push  
23 through that layer.

24 LT JOHNSON: Punch it up.

1           CAPT KYLE: Punch it up there, and that takes  
2 a little time to build, and very uncomfortable in that  
3 process. You want to minimize that time up from 150 to  
4 the surface to get a good look around.

5           LT JOHNSON: I felt, in retrospect, in  
6 walking around and thinking, I thought it was important  
7 to get that into the record, as well, that there is a  
8 dangerous zone in that transition where you are blind,  
9 no one can see you, you in effect are a hazard to  
10 navigation.

11           The only other question I have is just so you  
12 know, Lieutenant Coen qualified as OD in June, so that  
13 is about his experience level there.

14           Can an OOD request to be relieved at any  
15 time, if he is uncomfortable?

16           CAPT KYLE: Yes, sir, yes, he can.

17           LT JOHNSON: Can he make that request to the  
18 captain or any other qualified OOD on the vessel?

19           CAPT KYLE: He should, no, if he wants to be  
20 relieved, there is discussion of that in the standing  
21 orders, the Navy regs, it says he should request that  
22 from his captain.

23           LT JOHNSON: And this was available to  
24 Lieutenant Coen at any time he felt uncomfortable?

1           CAPT KYLE: It is a pretty big step, though.  
2       Most people --

3           LT JOHNSON: That was my next question was  
4       what the ramifications to an OOD who gets there and  
5       says, you know, I am out of my comfort zone here, and  
6       it appears that he is, and to quote Lieutenant Kusano,  
7       he is becoming nothing more than a parrot. I am  
8       responsible because I am on the logs as the OOD, but I  
9       am just parroting the captain, I am uncomfortable with  
10      this.

11               [Pause.]

12           LT JOHNSON: My question is going to  
13      Lieutenant Kusano about the parroting, you have got an  
14      OOD on the bridge who feels like I am not comfortable,  
15      I am nothing more than a parrot to the captain, I am on  
16      record, I am responsible.

17               What are the ramifications potentially to  
18      that OOD if he says, captain, you know, sir, I  
19      respectfully request to be relieve of office of the  
20      deck responsibilities, can that be a career ender for  
21      him?

22           CAPT KYLE: No.

23           LT JOHNSON: A fit rep, black eye?

24           CAPT KYLE: I don't think so. It may -- I

1     can't answer that question, it could be anything. I  
2     mean I expect it could have negative effects in the  
3     view of his commanding officer if the commanding  
4     officer's disposition is to be that way, hey, this guy  
5     has taken me on, I am going to get him, but again, I  
6     don't think in this case, Commander Waddle, you know,  
7     if anything, if he had said that, you know, what it  
8     would have probably done is set up alarm bells in  
9     Commander Waddle's mind, why is this guy asking this,  
10    maybe I am -- am I overstepping my bounds here.

11             You know, I don't know. I don't think  
12    Commander Waddle would hold it personally against him  
13    just knowing Commander Waddle.

14             LT JOHNSON: The reason I am asking these  
15    questions, I know a lot of it just calls for trying to  
16    get in the other guy's mind so to speak, but like I  
17    said earlier, in the interview with Lieutenant Coen,  
18    the thing that just kept surfacing on a regular basis  
19    was it was very crowded, very confusing in the control  
20    room, and I got the sense of watching him and listening  
21    to him that he was in a situation that he was not  
22    comfortable with, and I keep asking myself why didn't  
23    he bring that to the attention of the captain if he was  
24    uncomfortable.

1           That is kind of just so you know why I am  
2 looking at this.

3           CAPT KYLE: I don't think -- I don't think  
4 that would have had a

5           LT JOHNSON: Negative effect.

6           CAPT KYLE: My guess, if you are asking for  
7 speculation, is he may have felt uncomfortable, but for  
8 a lot of us, we felt uncomfortable driving ships when  
9 you are learning how to do it, and that is part of it,  
10 you know, it is like you wouldn't do anything new if  
11 you were comfortable with everything, you know, you  
12 wouldn't make any forward progress on anything.

13           A lot of what you have to do the first time  
14 is you have to -- you know, the first time you do any  
15 event, get on a bicycle to ride it, you are a little  
16 uncomfortable. I may fall over and hurt myself, but I  
17 am going to learn how to ride this bike, and you get on  
18 it, and you may fall over.

19           LT JOHNSON: Do you think the chief of staff  
20 being in there put a little sweat being on the OOD's  
21 head?

22           CAPT KYLE: I don't know if it made a sweat,  
23 but he in his mind most likely says I am uncomfortable,  
24 but I can do this, I am a hacker, I will make it

1 through.

2 LT JOHNSON: Thank you, sir. I don't have  
3 anything else.

4 LTJG KUSANO: This is Lieutenant Kusano  
5 again, based on Lieutenant Johnson's questions.

6 I know from experience on the surface, the  
7 way they had the fit reps, where you rank, where you  
8 rank early promote, must promote, and promotable, I  
9 don't know how it is in the sub world, but I remember  
10 as a JO, when we get our fit reps, where it was oh, oh,  
11 that is so-and-so, oh, that's the one who was  
12 progressing, and it was kind of, in the award room, you  
13 have so many JOs, and you know who got those positions,  
14 and I recall where you didn't want to mess up because  
15 you didn't want to be that person that was promotable,  
16 you didn't want to be that progressing individual.

17 Do you think that could play a factor for  
18 JOs?

19 CAPT KYLE: We have tried to take, especially  
20 for Lieutenant JGs, we don't put them in all those  
21 categories anymore because we feel that it is  
22 ridiculous, you know, if we have got guys who are  
23 sweating that stuff out, and it is ridiculous at the  
24 Lieutenant JG level, and so what is it we give them --

1 everybody is promotable.

2 LTJG KUSANO: I remember it almost created a  
3 back-stabbing environment.

4 CAPT KYLE: We saw that, took that off the  
5 table, so for particularly the junior guys, I mean get  
6 a little more senior, the department head level, and  
7 stuff, yes, you are in the competition business, and we  
8 kind of have to do that, but at the junior level, you  
9 are just learning your job, nonsense. We just said  
10 take that off the table, we are just going to write  
11 everybody promotable, everybody gets the same grade,  
12 and as long as you are not, you know, unsatisfactory, I  
13 mean you have an option to have that in there, but most  
14 of the cases it will be just the same as everybody  
15 else.

16 So, I don't think that is an issue here,  
17 because at the junior grade level, you would get sort  
18 of a generic evaluation there.

19 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: This is Tom Roth-Roffy. I  
20 would just like to follow up a little bit on the  
21 training issue.

22 Do you have, as part of your work-ups for  
23 deployment, a simulator training in which the team of  
24 people in the control work together as a team to

1 develop team skills? In the surface world, they call  
2 it bridge resource management; on aircraft, they call  
3 it cockpit resource management.

4 Does submarine training have a similar  
5 concept or training evolution?

6 CAPT KYLE: I mentioned in my previous  
7 statement that we would go to the training center. Up  
8 there, and you will see it later this week, you will go  
9 up and see we have essentially, exactly what you are  
10 talking, a Tact Team Trainer, and that is where they go  
11 up and practice the team skills of driving the ship in  
12 a tactical situation on a section basis.

13 You saw -- well, you haven't seen yet -- but  
14 you are going to see also on Tuesday the Ship Control  
15 Team Trainer, and that is for coordination of the  
16 people on the helms, the planesmen, chief of the watch,  
17 diving officer of the watch, to get their team working  
18 together.

19 We have the Piloting Team Trainer to teach  
20 the navigating party of the ship how to pilot in and  
21 out of port, how to work his team.

22 We have the Fire-Fighting and Damage Control  
23 Team Trainer to teach those guys how to do teamwork.  
24 It's over on Ford Island.

1           So, yes, there are numerous team training  
2 venues available.

3           MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Is there a team training for  
4 the sort of evolutions that the crew, or the office of  
5 the deck and the captain were doing, going to periscope  
6 depth, doing a search, and doing the emergency deep,  
7 would that sort of training --

8           CAPT KYLE: That is sort of an integrated  
9 training event. It transitions from a contact  
10 management event where you are planning to go to  
11 periscope depth, and the attack team training,  
12 laboratory or trainer would focus on that skill, and  
13 that is really one group of people in the control room  
14 work that.

15           The emergency deep and emergency surface  
16 procedure, that is the ship control side, and that  
17 would be trained on in a Ship Control Team Trainer. It  
18 really all comes together on the ship itself, so you  
19 work these different teams together, and the integrated  
20 product is trained on, on board, and you put all that  
21 together in one place.

22           To answer your question, we don't have a  
23 direct notification on the entire submarine all in one  
24 fell swoop ashore that would give you common -- in the

1     concept of an airplane cockpit that flies, and it is  
2     basically the whole control station is right there, but  
3     even an airline, as I understand it, an airline  
4     simulator, you don't have the seats in the back and the  
5     flight attendants, and all that, where the work, and I  
6     don't know, maybe they do, but I wouldn't think you  
7     would have a trainer that has a whole airplane there.  
8     I don't know, maybe there is, but I would think that  
9     would be crazy to buy something like that, too  
10    expensive.

11           MR. ROTH-ROFFY: During the at-sea training  
12    portion, is it also a testing portion where they are  
13    evaluated on their skills, and how do you separate the  
14    training from the appraisal aspects of the at-sea  
15    portion?

16           CAPT KYLE: The appraisal portion is very  
17    clearly delineated, when that is going to occur. It's  
18    at the end of the game, but there are workup periods  
19    ahead of time when the squadron and our staff, my  
20    staff, Commander Johnson's folks will go out and work  
21    with the team in the training standpoint.

22           It is very clearly understood when the  
23    evaluation starts. The boss comes down, the commodore  
24    comes down and looks at the ship, but that is not to

1 say that even during the evaluation we aren't doing  
2 training. We believe that we are training all the  
3 time. Anytime anybody is on the ship they are  
4 training, working problems.

5 So, you know, it is sort of like, well, when  
6 I was squadron commander and I came down to ride the  
7 ship, we would start out on day one, and I am  
8 evaluating the ship. I am going to give them a grade  
9 at the end, I am going to tell them where the strengths  
10 and weaknesses are, but it is not a deal where we come  
11 down and just write notes and keep them to ourselves,  
12 and sign a grade at the end of the week.

13 At the end of the day or at the end of the  
14 evolution, we will sit down and critique as we go, so  
15 that we have constant improvement, even when I am out  
16 doing the evaluation.

17 You know, it doesn't do me any good, it  
18 doesn't do the ship any good to hold these things as a  
19 secret to the end of the week or the end of the at-sea  
20 time and say here is your list of things you screwed up  
21 this week, and you are either sat or not sat.

22 We will hand those comments out as we go and  
23 work to improve as we are out there. It is clear in  
24 the ship's mind when the evaluation is occurring,

1     because usually the boss comes down, but in the  
2     meantime, there will be a lot of work ahead of time to  
3     prepare the ship and make sure it is ready for that  
4     inspection.

5             MR. ROTH-ROFFY: I have heard in the surface  
6     Navy that there has been a reduction in emphasis in the  
7     examination of proficiency and more towards training  
8     because I understand the ships were spending all of  
9     their time in a lot of stressful situations preparing  
10    for these various examinations.

11            Has there been any similar shift in the  
12    submarine service?

13            CAPT KYLE: Yes, yes, there has. We used to  
14    run an exam on our ships called the "tactical readiness  
15    exam," and it was the same deal. We put that in the  
16    schedule, and it would cause a lot of angst and a lot  
17    of work and a lot of, you know, at-sea time and fervor  
18    to get these guys underway, and we are finding that we  
19    were really running the ships extremely hard and really  
20    hard on the crews because of that.

21            We were at sea a lot, and there was sort of a  
22    redundant inspection process. We would have a  
23    commodore's inspection getting them ready for the  
24    tactical inspection, so there would be pre-inspections

1 and a real inspection. They would work up for the  
2 commodore's inspection, and then they would go to the  
3 next one.

4 So, we decided to consolidate that now to the  
5 commodore's inspection with participation of the same  
6 folks that used to do the tactical readiness exams with  
7 the commodore's inspection, so we kind of combined the  
8 two into one event, so we get the same kind of data,  
9 but without cycling the ship through multiple  
10 inspections of the same area to get more efficiency out  
11 of the process.

12 We, today, do not have enough submarines to  
13 do all the tasking that we have to do. We are working  
14 harder today out there than we ever have before for two  
15 reasons. The number of taskings have gone up, which is  
16 contrary to what you would think, the Cold War is over,  
17 think everything is great, but it isn't. There is a  
18 lot of stuff going on in the world that we are involved  
19 in.

20 The number of taskings have gone up, the  
21 number of boats have come down. We have downsized the  
22 size of the military, the number of submarine force, so  
23 the only answer is we have got to be, to answer that  
24 call, we have to become more efficient in the time we

1 have to work with the ships and what they do.

2 We can't be wasting time with multiple  
3 inspections of the same area, you know, kind of  
4 overkilling that thing. So, yes, we have reduced it,  
5 but I think we are still okay in that respect in terms  
6 of number of reviews and oversight. We are very  
7 careful about reducing that inspection.

8 That was a challenge given us by the Chief of  
9 Naval Operations back in 1998-99. He said we have got  
10 to reduce the interdeployment training load on all of  
11 our ships and air squadrons, and we responded to that.

12 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Could you describe the cycle  
13 time for these workups, the deployment and the return,  
14 and where in that evolution or that cycle was the  
15 Greeneville?

16 CAPT KYLE: The cycle time varies. This is  
17 an area of great interest right now because before this  
18 incident occurred, that was consuming most of my time  
19 working this particular issue.

20 The cycle time for most of the operating  
21 ships is down to what we refer to as a 2.0 turnaround  
22 ratio. They go on deployment for six months and will  
23 return, and will deploy again 12 months later. Twice  
24 the amount of time they are back. That is the bare

1 bones minimum that the Chief of Naval Operations will  
2 allow us to turn a ship around is 2 times the  
3 deployment length.

4 So, we are hovering. Most of our operating  
5 ships are hovering right now in 2.1 to 2.2, to 2.3  
6 maybe turnaround ratios, somewhere in that zone. Some  
7 of them are actually at 2.0.

8 Greenville has been back for a while. Let's  
9 see, she -- I am not familiar, I have lost it right  
10 now. She had a slight restricted availability in  
11 there, so she has been back a while, but I don't know  
12 where her next deployment is in the cycle. I would  
13 have to look that up, I don't remember. She is not in  
14 this POM process.

15 She has gone to EASTPAC after the SRA, and I  
16 think she is -- she is definitely not in the POM  
17 process, I would have known that. Like I say, when  
18 people enter the POM, they kind of get special  
19 treatment, so she is just in the middle of a cycle,  
20 probably to deploy in --

21 CDR JOHNSON: Her wideband install is like  
22 early next year, early in 02, so it would be six months  
23 after that, I think it would be summer of 02.

24 CAPT KYLE: So, she is ways away. She is

1 just a ship on line out here doing her normal training  
2 and sustaining of readiness. Ideally, we would like to  
3 have them out there at 2.8 to 2.9 to 3.0. It makes it  
4 a much more achievable schedule.

5 I think Greeneville must be -- she is  
6 probably a little longer than that, she is probably  
7 well beyond the average, because she has several  
8 maintenance things that are in her slot.

9 I have said several times, well, she doesn't  
10 have this modernization, she doesn't have that, she  
11 doesn't have that, so we are trying -- she is back here  
12 now. She will have a series of modernization periods  
13 to get her equipment up to the fleet standard right  
14 now. Unfortunately, now, she will deploy even later, I  
15 think, because she will be in dry dock or a while here  
16 I think.

17 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Any estimate of the damage,  
18 the repair periods?

19 CAPT KYLE: They are estimating a minimum of  
20 38, 37 days, something like near 40 just to replace the  
21 SHT that was torn. That is a very complex process.  
22 You have got to put that stuff on there, cure it, heat  
23 it, all this kind of stuffy.

24 They have to look at the rudder, the

1 circularity issues, and the hull casting, health and  
2 welfare of the hull. If the rudder is severely  
3 damaged, there is significant damage underneath that  
4 rudder, that can greatly extend the availability.

5 The last time we had a major damage to a  
6 rudder on a submarine, somebody was telling me the  
7 story -- I remember the case -- two submarines collided  
8 during an exercise, and that submarine was tied up for  
9 like six or eight months while they fixed that rudder.

10 The rudders, the Greeneville has a special propeller,  
11 you know, unique propeller, unique stern planes  
12 configuration, so although we have a lot of  
13 decommissioned ships around, she is one of like three  
14 or four submarines that have a special design, so we  
15 don't have decommissioned ships to go pull these major  
16 castings from, major components, and if there is some  
17 serious damage in there in some of the steering gear,  
18 we might turnaround a contractor and starting over  
19 again with building some equipment, which would be a  
20 lengthy delay.

21 It works well enough for surface operations,  
22 but we have got to go in and do some more looks in the  
23 dry dock to see. If there is something else wrong back  
24 there, we have got to understand it better.

1           MR. ROTH-ROFFY:   Often we get a damage  
2       estimate from the owner of the vessel.   At this time,  
3       are you able to, have you provided anybody with an  
4       estimate of the damage to the submarine?

5           CAPT KYLE:   I have told you everything that I  
6       know in terms of media equipment, stuff that has been  
7       done.   We will have to get back to you.   Until we get  
8       into dry dock and do some of these other detailed  
9       measurements that require dry-docking, we won't be able  
10      to give you a full assessment.

11           That is one of the main reasons we are going  
12      in, because we need to go in and do that stuff.   You  
13      have got to measure the circularity of the hull, you  
14      have got to go in and look at some of these hull  
15      castings to see if they are cracked, and we have got to  
16      get in that steering gear area, which we can do it from  
17      waterborne, but it is a lot easier doing it in dry  
18      dock.

19           As you have seen on the ships, the actual  
20      rudder, steering gear, and everything is always on  
21      surface is submerged, so you have to go in with divers  
22      to look at that stuff.   It is pretty tough if you are  
23      waterborne.

24           MR. ROTH-ROFFY:   I think that is all I have

1     for now. I would like to pass the interviewing to Bill  
2     Woody.

3             MR. WOODY: -- use ESM or is ESM operator  
4     involved?

5             CAPT KYLE: Yes. In my mind, normal  
6     procedure for doing this event, you would want an  
7     all-sensor search, periscope depth. You would do your  
8     initial look probably at 60 feet or 58, depending on  
9     the sea state, 58 feet, and then the next step would  
10    be, more importantly really, the next step would be to  
11    come significantly shallower, you know, down to 50 feet  
12    or something like that, get the scope very high.

13            During that time, that would give the ESM  
14    operator plenty of time to do a full search of all  
15    bands, and for yourself, to really assess out in the  
16    CON, listening to early warning receiver, of any strong  
17    radar contact that was imposing, you know, radiating on  
18    the periscope. You would hear that strong pulse.

19            I think the normal procedure for doing the  
20    pre-search, the safety search of the immediate area at  
21    periscope depth would be to deploy the periscope well  
22    including the ESM system on the top of there to see if  
23    there is any close contacts.

24            MR. WOODY: Would you discuss the character

1 of the operating area where the Greenville was  
2 operating, the pros and cons perhaps, whether it is a  
3 good area, a bad area, shipping lines, anything that  
4 you can think of?

5 CAPT KYLE: We have operated there fairly  
6 frequently. I have been out there. The operating  
7 area, the classic traffic around Honolulu is out of  
8 Honolulu Harbor on the south side of Oahu, and the  
9 shipping generally has one of two directions, eastbound  
10 to the Continental United States, and they will proceed  
11 right along the southern shore of Oahu, just past  
12 Diamondhead, probably not more than 4 to 6 miles off  
13 the coast of Oahu, just outside -- you know, well off  
14 the reef, but not that far to sea because it is out of  
15 their way.

16 They would cut along the coast of Oahu,  
17 southern coast of Oahu, and then turn north through the  
18 Kaiwi Channel between Oahu and Molokai and then proceed  
19 to the Continental United States or even further south  
20 to head for Panama or something like that.

21 There is also significant barge traffic  
22 between Honolulu and the other islands, but again that  
23 follows almost the same shipping lane. If you are  
24 going eastbound to one of the eastern islands, Maui or

1 the big Island of Hawaii, they would head the same way  
2 this time crossing Kaiwi Channel to Molokai, then south  
3 of Molokai and then up either to Maui or to the Big  
4 Island, but they would also be transiting fairly close  
5 to the shoreline of Oahu for the initial period.

6 This operating area is seaward of where this  
7 boat was operating, it is seaward of that general  
8 shipping area. Up closer to Honolulu, in the evening  
9 time, again well north of where we were, where the  
10 Greenville was on this day, there is significant  
11 dinner cruise traffic right up along the Waikiki  
12 coastline, but that is only a mile or two off the  
13 beach, very close into land.

14 The only people heading south out of  
15 Honolulu, as far south as 9 miles south, are typical,  
16 an occasional fishing ship going, not that much traffic  
17 happens coming down south out of Honolulu. There is  
18 nothing south of Hawaii. I mean it goes, it is a long  
19 ways down there. Nine miles is really out of the way  
20 for most traffic.

21 If you look at that chart there, you can see  
22 just the layout of the state. Barge shipping going to  
23 Maui or the Big Island, across that area of shallow  
24 water there, called Penguin Bank, will come straight

1 off of Honolulu, head between Molokai and Linai, and  
2 then either go to Maui or will cut north through that  
3 channel, north, either that way or down along the coast  
4 of Maui down to the Big Island.

5 There is a port on the north side of Maui,  
6 that is their main shipping port, so they will go  
7 around the north side there to Kahului. There is some  
8 traffic that comes out of Honolulu, heads westbound  
9 toward Kawai or to Japan.

10 If they are going to Japan, they will follow  
11 that line that says Hula straight up and merchant  
12 traffic will head up that direction towards Japan or to  
13 the Far East. But there is not much that goes out as  
14 far as -- there is no real reason to go out as far as 9  
15 or 10 miles off of Honolulu.

16 There are places where there is less traffic,  
17 but it not a heavy trafficked area. If you go out 60  
18 miles south, for instance, if we do weapons'  
19 detonations or something like that, we are going to do  
20 weapons deployment, we will go out 50 to 70 miles  
21 southwest of Honolulu, and basically, there is nobody  
22 out there. The traffic is very, very thin.

23 You will see an occasional fisherman go by,  
24 but not much else.

1           MR. WOODY: Thanks very much. That is all  
2 the questions I have.

3           MR. ROTH-ROFFY: With no further questions  
4 being tendered, the time is 1039, and that concludes  
5 our interview with Captain Kyle.

6           [End of interview of Captain Kyle.]

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